ESSAYES
OR
Moral Discourses
On several
SUBJECTS.

[Culpeper, Sir Thomas, 1626-91

Written by a Person of Honour.

LONDON:

Printed by *H. Bruges*, for *Thomas Proudlove* and are to be sold at his Shop at the Turn-stile, near *New-market* in *Lincolns-Inne* Fields, 1671.

X 827
C89e

13 II 10 Craig.

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Of

Of Eſſayes.

THe word *Eſſay*, we have From the French, in which Tongue it ſignifies a tryal or probation: As it is applyed to things, it admits of no poſitive definition, which might be the reaſon, that neither their great *Eſſayiſt Montaigne*, nor the Lord *Bacon* our more incomparable writer in the ſame kind, hath thought requiſite to define the word, becauſe it hath ſo little to do with the matter it handles; rather expreſſing a generality of knowledge, then oblig'd to any particular Science: as we ſee in building, there are many Artiſts, that may own the compleating of ſome parts of the Fabrick, yet not claim the perfecting, of the whole ſtructure, ſo in *Eſſayes* there is required inſtructions

from Philoſophy, Hiſtory, and what elſe can be uſefully expreſſed for other obſervations, and moralities of life, that in them a man may read an Epitomy of himſelf, and the world together: neither is it wit, and eloquence, (the ornaments of the Pen and thought) more lively to be expreſſed in any kind of writing, then in this of Eſſayes, which as they treat of men and manners (the moſt natural imployment of our beſt conceptions) there ought to be in them ſuch a pertinent ingenuity, as tends moſt to application and benefit. Hiſtories may diſcover the actions of ſome perticular times and men, whilſt Eſſayes have more familiarity with our ſelves and buſineſs, giving us beſides an uſeful acquaintance both of the dead and living together.

Nor are they to be [illegible] deſcants upon ſuch or ſuch perticular ſubjects, (like the wit or clinch of an Epigram) or the ſmart ſayings in Characters and Satyrs (though handling much of the ſame Argument) nor the ſweet and elegant inſinuations of Poets, and Orators, that can contain the buſineſs of Eſſayes, though they may gather ſome honey from

from the beſt flowers of wit, and learning, they have a limitation from none, and yet come nearer our ſelves, then theſe can make them; which as it is a juſt dignity appertaining to this kind of writing, ſo it needed not to have been mentioned to the judicious Reader, who can not be unknowing thereof: beſides I am not to forget, that in extolling the Subject which I handle, I do in ſome ſort prompt a greater expectation in point of performance, then I deſire the Reader ſhould have from my abilities, ſince howſoever this book comes now to be publiſhed, it was but the reſult of private thoughts, by which I endeavoured to take ſome proſpect of the opinions, buſineſs, and manners of the world (being indeed the chief accompliſhments of humane life) though not without hopes, that if theſe papers at any time were made ſo bold, as to be ſeen by the world in Print, it would not be altogether without that profit, which I have reapt from them my ſelf.

Of Nature.

THat Supream power by which is given a being to things, may be called Providence, Nature, or whatsoever excellent and divine attribute we think fit to allow it; though of all these, the word Nature is more intelligible to our sence, because as it is applicable to every individual being, it doth not only import as much, but gives us the best reason of them, as they differ in subsistence, thus Plants, Beasts, and men, are more distinguished by their manner of being, then by any superiority of perfection, that can be claimed by any of these; because it must be supposed, that Nature intended them equally perfect in their several kinds, to conceive otherwise, were to lessen her own excellence. Though it be not for that reason to be expected that every production of hers should partake absolutely of it. The great Structure of the world, being not unfitly to be compared to a building, which is more compleat in the whole, then in its parts; we do not see a Vegetive, or Animal,

nimal, doth anſwer this intendment of nature, by reaſon that in all theſe, there are ſome more excellent of the ſame kind, which could not be a partiality in Nature, and is no leſs then demonſtrative, that there was a perfection deſign'd them, above what is actually in them: We may obſerve as many deformed and imperfect Plants, Trees and Beaſts, as there are Men, who have the diſadvantages of their wills, and paſſions to prejudice their beings: The very Elements themſelves, (though the compoſitions of all things) have not leſs imperfections, then our ſelves, or whatſoever is effected by them, they commix their diſtempers with one another, as well as in what they produce; ſo that Nature doth as it were deſcend below her ſelf to embelliſh her works: If it be demanded why Nature doth effect leſs perfect, then ſhe intends, it may be anſwered, that it is her dignity to appear more excellent then mechanical in her operations; like ſome profound Artiſt, that deſignes more the greatneſs and beauty of his works, then the exactneſs of materials, which ſhould compleat them.

them. This assertion may well excuse Nature from being accountable for those defects which she produces, because she was not only free from irregularity and deformity in her counsels, but intended that every individual being of hers, should be most perfect in its kind, though not actually effected such; which tells us, she was more concerned in being an efficient, then a final cause: Neither is the perfection of things to be argued from their durations, (though their continuation might be supposed eternal) because there are to be found many greater excellencies in those individuals that are subject to generation and corruption, and other alterations depending on these, (though in some sence the common and mean courie of Natures continuance) then are to be found in the Sun and Moon and Stars, which for ought we know to the contrary, (otherwise then by Scripture) have not suffered any change, but for ever may remain as unalterable in their being, and glories, as we now behold them: Let man be the example (or any other creature of a generous kind) and I suppose there

there are none who will deny that any one faculty of the Soul of either, deſerves a more ſuperlative eſteem, then the brightneſs, motion, or any other eſſential and higher attribute which can be given the Cæleſtial bodies, becauſe they obey only the order of Nature, whilſt the one of theſe hath the conduct of Reaſon, the other of Sence, for his guide, and greater dignity; though it be not to be averred, that either of theſe do compleat the intendments of Nature, in the beſt of their faculties, becauſe there are not only defects, but likewiſe degrees of perfection in their ſeveral beings, which aſſure us, that they do not exactly fulfil the ends of Nature; if they did, they could not be differenced, or unequal in any faculty, ſo that, not only every man, but any one thing of the ſame kind (whether Animal or Vegetive) muſt be perfect alike. The Scripture aſſures us, that by the omnipotent command of God, the world and what it then contain'd, had an actual or potential being, (for it is not to be concluded, that the exiſtence of all things was contemporary with the Creati-

on; but rather ſuch generalities of things, that might by commixture, or otherwiſe effectually produce the reſt, as is obſervable in ſeveral Plants, and Animals, which almoſt every age diſcovers, though unknown to the former; for if we conſider the words of the Divine Mandate, in order to the Creation, we ſhall find that they gave to ſo wonderful an operation, ſome limits. Thus we read, that God cauſed the Sea and Earth to bring forth every individual thing after their kind; which could not imply an abſolute perfection, becauſe we do not underſtand from the Text, that thoſe Elements were pure in themſelves, at the time of the Creation; neither, if God had otherwiſe decreed, (and that all things had been produced without any irregularities in their natures) can it be comprehended how they could have effected them, becauſe it had not been in their power to have ſo far debas'd and prejudic'd their beings; ſo likewiſe the fall of *Adam* had been as impoſſible, if there had been no enormity in his nature, which had produced his ſin: in like manner where the Scrip-

Scripture ſaith, that not only himſelf, but mankind together with all other creatures, were by a curſe from Heaven to degenerate from their firſt excellencies, I ſuppoſe it may be as well underſtood of a greater degree of imperfection then was known to their firſt ſubſiſtencies, and not an immediate lapſe of Nature from perfect, to imperfect, which is ſomewhat more impoſſible to imagine, though in a deciſion of this kind, I judge it ſafeſt to ſubmit our reaſons to our faith, and the moſt Orthodox interpretation of Scripture. The Stoicks, who (above all other Sects of Phyloſophers) were the moſt rigid aſſertors of Vertue, inſomuch as they did in a manner require an abſtraction of the Soul, from the ſence of paſſions, and other depraved inclinations, without which they did not allow a man wiſe, or happy, were ſo blinded with this Heroick doctrine of theirs, as they did not perceive, that Nature had not by many degrees that exactneſs in her productions, and effects, which ſhe intended as a cauſe, (for the reaſons already ſpecified) and ſo conſequently that ſtricktneſs of virtue, their

their principles required, ſhould be practical in men, was rather to be eſteemed an Ornament of their Schooles, then to be accompliſhed by the power of humanity, which makes us ſenſible of many defects even in the moſt ſupream attributes that can be given to our rational faculties, Wherefore I cannot but wonder, that *Seneca*, notwithſtanding his wit and learning, ſhould ſo far Patronage this Dream of Stoical perfection, to which purpoſe he doth (according to that Philoſophy) thus ſumme in few words humane felicity. *Quæris quid ſit hominis bonum, animus & ratio, in animo perfecta, rationale enim animal eſt homo, conſummatur itaque ejus bonum, ſi id ad implevit cui natus eſt.* Not conſidering that Nature did not oblige her ſelf to perfect her intendments in us; as hath been inſtanced before, on which account we are not able to live up to that excellency of reaſon, ſhe had deſign'd for our glory; nor do I judge there was ever in mankind any example, that practically agreed with this doctrine of the Stoicks; ſince if the world had ever afforded one man, or woman, that had been

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naturally and morrally perfect, there would have been as well more, nay both Sexes, might have been produced without any defect in Virtue, or any rational facultie ſubſervient to it; for though mankind is differenced by ſome degrees of excellence, we muſt not therefore charge Nature to have ſo much fallen below her dignity, as to admit the ſo far diſtant contrarieties of perfection, and imperfection, abſolutely taken, which could not be ſuitable to her act, or to any individuals of the ſame kind: could we but do or contemplate without defect, we might not only claim ſo much Divinity in our ſelves, as tends to the compleating of reaſon and Nature, but might be enabled to judge how far the powers of our ſouls fall ſhort of that dignity that was firſt deſigned us; of which, we have only now ſome irregular and obſcure notions: we might then have perceived how defective the beſt of our prudence, juſtice, temperance, fortitude, (and whatſoever depends on theſe) would have appeared to our more ſublime capacities, which though the All-diſpoſing power hath not thought

thought fit to permit us, there is enjoyed ſo much by us, to the wonder of our reaſons, that we are in a high meaſure obliged to acknowledge the bounties of Providence, and Nature, that have ſo far dignified our beings: The beſt of our actions brings us backward, and forward together; and when they moſt aſcend, they have their *Non ultra*, like a ſcale, whoſe greateſt altitude conſiſts in its laſt ſtep: Reaſon is mans proper excellency, and he can loſe all other without impoveriſhing his ſoul; notwithſtanding we do not find it rich enough to purchaſe moral perfection, which is not only above its power, but likewiſe more excellent then can be obtain'd by any grace of Religion, ſince whilſt our affections and manners are naturally depraved, we are not capable of a true degree of ſpiritual perfection; wherefore we are beholding to faith, which doth obliege (as much as in us lies) to contemplate it here, but to expect its conſummation in another world.

Of Buſineſs.

BUſineſs is the imployment of life, and abſtracts man ſo much from himſelf, that it ingroſſes the greateſt part of his thoughts, and actions; whoſoever hath the leaſt, muſt needs have enongh in the troubles and contingent affairs of the world: To ſome men it gives ſuch a reſtraint as they live but like Priſoners at large, being ſo fetter'd to their affairs, as they ſeldome have time to be at liberty with themſelves, *Beatus qui procul negotijs*, ſayes *Horace:* and true it is that a wiſe man is ſeldome a ſeeker of buſineſs, or a cutter out of ſuch work for himſelf, and therefore he will ever avoid this burthen, or at leaſt uſe his beſt dexterity to caſt it off, there being of neceſſity much of folly and impertinence and evil annexed to buſineſs, ſince a prudent man muſt often in this caſe (though againſt his will) have to do with the fooliſh, ignorant, and diſhoneſt, which makes neither for his ſatisfaction or reputation: If a great Emperour valued a Crown not worth the ſtooping for, in re-

reſpect of the burthen and troubles it brought with it, how had he undervalued the mean diſquiets and trifles of the world, which like Bryars and Thorns, the reſtleſs Nature of Man, does as it were plant in the way he treads. There are but three things that can juſtly contract buſineſs, an honeſt concern for the publick, our friends, or our ſelves, and certainly there is little other mixture of intereſt, but muſt needs corrupt it: Others there are that move in the world, as if they repreſented *Siſiphus* wheel, ſeeming never to be at reſt, embracing all occaſions of troubles let them be never ſo litigious, and endleſs, as if they prayed to Heaven not ſo much for dayly bread, as dayly buſineſs; if they have no buſineſs within their own doors, and concernments, they will rather then fail go to market to find it; A Monopolie cannot be more grievous to the Common-wealth then a meer undertaker, and ingroſſer of buſineſs, is to the quiet of his neighbours, and the publick peace, he is ever ſetting forward their vexations, but takes little care to compoſe any, it being many

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ny times (as he orders things) more for his intereſt and profit to do neither, although he repreſents nothing more facile to be accompliſhed then the affairs he undertakes, not obſerved by his Clyents until they have paſſed ſome time, and are well forward in the way of their vexation, when they may find the end of their journey, if they can, to be ſure he intends their troubles no period: And it is ſome wonder what ſhould provoke ſo uncharitable and impertinent an humour in men of this kind of inclination, ſince there cannot be much pleaſure to themſelves in contracting a perpetual diſquiet, me thinks the vanity of this humour is not much unlike to that of Seamen, who had rather be converſant with ſtorms, then in a calme on ſhore, there being in many men ſomething of Pride and vain glory to imbark with troubles, inſomuch that buſy men generally will rather comply with miſchief, then be at reſt; it is alſo obſervable, that ſubtle, and ambitious men are much of this temper in hope to be more eminent for employment, as if the publick was to be threatned with their abilities

bilities before hand, and ſo brought to employ them in its own defence. There are another ſort of men, who are ſo in love with the repute of wiſdome and gravity, as they will ſpend their time, like ſo many politick-would-bees, ſtill ſeeming imployed, though without buſineſs, and though they are drones in their underſtanding, the Bee is not buſier then they are; togather the beſt ſubſtance of affaires, inſomuch as they cannot endure to take the ayr, but where buſineſs and news is growing, not few of theſe tread the walks of our Courts and Exchanges, which they weare out to little purpoſe. I have known ſeveral perſons of this kind of humour, that took marvelous delight in delivering forreign, and domeſtick intelligence to the company they converſed with, (of which they were at no ſmall labour to be informed) and next would take upon them to be (as it were) the mouth of the ſociety, as to the importance and conſequence of ſuch affairs, though they took but a ſlight and ordinary proſpect of what they might produce; by which we may perceive that there is ſome itch in man-

mankind to be thought comprehenſive and wiſe, though in things above his abilities: I had rather do any thing (excepting what is evil) then be idle, ſince it is an abuſe of time, one of the moſt pretious talents of life, on the other ſide to be impertinently buſie is ſuch a mockage of our ſelves and hours together, that we ſeem to do leſs then nothing; to be ſhort, there is no man can want honeſt and pertinent buſineſs, ſince every man's private or publick affairs calls enough for his Employment; he that ſeeks more is injurious to himſelf and the world, which he troubles to little purpoſe, ſuch a man being ſeldome a good friend, but whereſoever he engages, a moſt vexatious enemy.

Of Oportunity, and Diſpatch.

After buſineſs, it is pertinent to treat of *Oportunity* and *Diſpatch*, being things properly annexed to all mens affairs, without which, Buſineſs would be a kind of *Infinitum*, an endleſs perplexity, and toyle, given to

our ſelves to no purpoſe; there is nothing in Nature moves but in order to reſt and ſome determinate Period; and therefore it abhors a perpetual diſturbance; whilſt a man careleſly and impertinently imployed, not being able to embrace fit oportunities to bring himſelf to quiet, gives himſelf an unnatural and fruitleſs moleſtation: though there are not a few in the world that covet to have their lives repreſent a perpetual motion, and would take it not a little ill of the world and themſelves, ſhould they reſt from imployment, ſuch are rather buſie men, then men of buſineſs, or meer undertakers, (as we touched already) who have little to do with this Eſſay, ſince Oportunity and Diſpatch are the leaſt things minded in affairs they manage, but a wiſe and conſiderate man will annex both as much as in him lies, to the buſineſs he undertakes, that is, he will take a due proſpect of the end in the beginning of his occaſions; and doubtleſs he ſtrangely offends his own quiet that doth otherwiſe, a crime which a Prudent man will hardly commit, who can never be brought

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to trifle ſo much with himſelf and the world at once.

There is a great dexterity in managing oportunity and diſpatch in order to our occaſions, which ſome men are ſo happy in, that there is by that means little of their undertakings unſucceſful; and indeed he can ſeldome want a right ſence in his affairs, who underſtands that well, take it in whatſoever imployment or buſineſs of life: If we look up to the Court, we ſhall find that whoſoever waytes beſt on opertunity, find the leaſt repulſe from his Prince, there being ſometimes when Princes are leſs Serene, and more uneaſy in their Thrones, ſo conſequently leſs diſpoſed to Grace and Favour, the ſplendor and benignity of the Sun cannot be expected when he is clouded: So if you have to do with his Miniſters, there is a fitting ſeaſon to improve your diſpatch, for men ſeldome gratifie others well, when diſpleaſed themſelves: It is true there have been ſome of this magnitude that have had a kind of glory in having their rooms crowded with ſuitors. *Quas delectat ſuperbiæ ſuæ longum ſpectaculum*,

as if they could be content, their floors ſhould be marked with every mans foot, who had been their dayly Orator, it being their uſual manner to promiſe all, though they obliege few; *Ne minor ſit rogantium turba*, as *Seneca* obſerved in his time: there is nothing ſo diſobliging, as to let a ſuitor depend long, a man had rather have his hopes cut off then deferred, beſides ſuch cannot expect to receive a full gratitude, who ſowre the ſweetneſs of a favour beforehand, the like may be ſaid in all occaſions of mankind, there is a gratiouſneſs in diſpatch, as well as in application: and what men call Fortune, is generally no other but the beſt conduct of our affairs, and actions; a wiſe Captain will take the beſt oportunity to aſſault his Enemy, a Lover will do the like to gain his Miſtreſs, it is a part of Prudence to judge when we are beſt diſpoſed to aſſiſt our ſelves, our inclinations have their beſt ſeaſons, and it were a high neglect not to improve the advantages of time, which Providence hath appointed to waite upon our affairs; ſeaſonable oportunity reſembling much the repreſenta-

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tion of time, there is no good hold to be taken but by the Forelock, *Poſt eſt occaſio calva*, and certainly their is nothing ſlips from us ſooner then the benefit of occaſion, if not duly attended. A man well converſant in the Practique part of buſineſs, ſeldome miſſes the ſhorteſt way to dipatch, which another better skil'd in the Theory ſhall want; one may be a good adviſer, though an ill Sollicitor, but he is beſt compleated for his occaſions in whom both are joyned.

Of Providence.

THere is no word hath larger and more various ſignification then Providence, and indeed the ſence is no leſs ſtrange, and great; The Antients meant by it Fate, Deſtiny, or the Preordination of Cauſes and Effects: By the latter ſence is underſtood the order of the Univerſe, or the beſt reaſon of the being of things, which *Seneca* ſomewhere calls Nature; by all theſe we may better conceive the definition or word, then what either means; and

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certainly that must have a divine signification, which gives the world an order, and subsistence; we may allow it to be at least the Divinity of Nature: And since it is not easy to comprehend more of the Essence of a Deity, we may well suppose it hath some being in the works it produces, and maintains, for in those it hath more of a finite conception, then if abstracting the consideration absolutely of so unlimited a perfection, we contemplate what the Essence must be alone, and then we must allow it the name of Godhead, or infinite Nature, Providence, and the like, all which are equivalent to an immence or God-like being; and he must have an understanding above the world, that knowes how to define its Essence otherwise: Tis enough we can reverence the cause by the effect, then which there is nothing more familiar to our understandings, we behold the Skie to be Azure, the Grass to be green, although we are not able to give a reason why they are of those colours, rather then of any other; The acts of Providence are alwayes in our view, though we

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cannot perceive its being, their is an unperceptible mind, order, and power, that guides the universe, and every individual thereof, and yet we know not where it abides: Providence actuates the world, like the Soul in the body, which benefits every member and part; the excellency of Providence is to be found as much in the production of a flower as a ſtar: If a man conſiders himſelf and all ſublunary things, he muſt of neceſſity grant his and their compoſitions to be of the ſame principles of Nature, and mixture of Elements, are not heat and moiſture the cheif ingredients of our ſubſiſtence, as well as of Plants, Trees, and Beaſts, from whence we may not irrationally argue that the life of any of theſe is as dear to Nature as ours, and perhaps are informed by the ſame ſoul, though in different bodies; it being no idle, as well as an antient opinion, that the informing power is alike in all things, there being reaſonably to be ſuppoſed but one mind in Nature, and conſequently one ſoul actuating the world, and all it concerns; to which purpoſe the Poet elegantly deſcribes it thus,

——Deum namque ire per omnes
Terraſque tractuſque maris, cælumque profundum,
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne (ferarum, &c.

He therefore that denyes this wonderful mind and providence which we muſt grant ſo perſpicuouſly manifeſteth it ſelf, through the univerſal proceedings of Nature, is far more then an Atheiſt, for he is an Infidel againſt reaſon, that wants no evidence to aſſure it; but if any ſhould interrogate what this Providence, this mind, and diſpoſing power is? (to which we find the world is ſubordinate) how did it begin? and how doth it continue? to anſwer theſe particulars, the Arithmatick of reaſon would fail us, becauſe the account is too ſuperlative to be rendred; and we may as well conclude that it ſhall never end (though it is no certain argument) ſince no man is able to take cognizance of its beginning, the courſe and order of Nature being like a circle, in which it is hard to gueſs from what point the circumference was drawn,

drawn, the virtue of its operations being visible as well below us, as above us: Therefore if we annex Providence to order, or motion, we bring our thoughts into a Labarinth, and trace a circle to no other purpose, but to make our understandings giddy, as we go round with things we may end as well where we begin; as begin to end. I would as soon take a Coblers word for the conceptions of Nature, Providence, of the worlds beginning, and preservation as it is, as I will *Aristotles*, *Epicurus*, and the rest of the Philosophers: What nonsence was it in the first of these to attribute the order and being of the world, unto a first, and immoveable cause, which he supposed must be in the course of motion, since he doth not demonstrate what is that first cause, and if taken for granted as he concludes, there is a quære, as great, How any thing can be supposed unalterable and immoveable, and yet give motion to so many other subsistencies, and changes, in Nature. The opinion of *Epicurus* is no less frivolous who would teach us that the world was produced by a for-

tuitous concourſe of Atoms jumbled together, as if Providence could be ſo lazie, and ſluggiſh, as to leave a work (ſo much its concernment and glory to chance) he might have as well concluded, that Fortune not an internal mind, or order, gave the being and reaſon of things, theſe and the like are rather ſportive, then ſolid ſuppoſitions, and ſhew us how men play the fool with their underſtandings; nor cannot it be denyed but ſo ſublime a miſtery muſt needs put reaſon to the ſtand: we perceive the ſtreams of Providence, but the ſpring-head is above our diſcernment, and yet there is no incongruity in concluding that there is a more Divine, and excellent being, then we can deſcribe, or manifeſt by reaſon; *Ariſtotle* could allow the heavenly bodies a fifth unalterable ſubſtance, different from all ſublunary things; and do we not perceive, (though there is no greater demonſtration of Providence in the preſervation and being of the refulgent bodies of the Sun and Stars, then in the meaneſt vegitables) that there is a difference in their eſſence, uſe, and duration; ſo if we e-

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levate our conceptions higher, we may judge their is by many infinite degrees, a more excellent ſubſtance then theirs leſs, ſubject to change and alteration, and which contains the attributes of Providence, order, and divine ſubſiſtency. Tis true our underſtandings are too much in the dark to diſcover farther this bright and tranſcendent being; the ſureſt way therefore is to beleive what we do not know, he that doth otherwiſe, is unwiſe, and irreligious.

There is another conſideration of Providence which is in reſpect of the affairs and actions of our life, the events whereof are ſo ſtrangely wonderful, that it were a groſs ſtupidity to judge that they are not inclined and ſwayed by a power without us: How miraculous are the changes and ſucceſs of things of which the Age we live in hath too many remarkable examples? how many have eſcaped battails and other actions of Hoſtility beyond all reaſonable expectation? a man muſt likewiſe confeſs that the ſeveral diverſities, and alterations of Government, could not be the foreſight

or intendment of any, becauſe the events were too extraordinary for humane management: Tis true we are willing to attribute to our wills a diſpoſing power of our ſelves, and affairs, and yet there is no Creature but man, that claims this liberty by Nature, or that would be ſo much a Tyrant to himſelf; We can govern a horſe with a bridle, and with a line command the dog, and ſhall we beleive there is no curb given our ſelves? Thus we ought to conſider this circumſtantial part of Providence, as it hath relation to the various accidents of our lives, but of this more ſhall be ſaid in an other diſcourſe.

Of Time.

THere is nothing more natural and eſſential to us then Time, ſince we are beholding to it for every moment of our lives, and when it ceaſes to be ours, we are no more: From it we have every period of being and life, both in the womb, and on the earth: we count our ages,

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and continuance of all things from its Kalender, as an inſeperable companion of our lives and the world's ſubſiſtence. It is leſs to be wanted, then any other neceſſary ſupport of life, we can paſs by a meal, or faſt a dayes journey of the Sun, but time we muſt ſtill devour, or it gives death leave to feed upon us; there is no being for us without every inconſiderable minute, inſomuch that Providence ſeems to have dealt more bountifully and largely with us in the diſpenſing of Time, then in any other act of its gooneſs, whereſoever the Sun is beheld, he enlightens our hours, nor doth a Star riſe and ſet, but his motion is appointed for the calculation of time, under whoſe conduct is both the world and man, Nature would be at a ſtand, without this guide, and muſt ſoon behold her decay and ruine, were ſhe not repaired with dayes and ſeaſons fit to produce her works: There is nothing more familiar with us, and leſs diſcerned, *In tempore vivimus & ſentimus, & quid ſit tempus, ignoramus*; ſaith *Ariſtotle*, who was in nothing more at a ſtand, then in the account he gives of time: Nor could I ever ſub-

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mit to the general definition of Phyloſophers, who define it to be *menſura motuum*; Every Vegitive and Animal have a movement from Nature, though but in order to increaſe, and groath, likewiſe the Sun more perſpicuous then all theſe, and of a more excellent operation, doth rather repreſent the Carryer, or Poſt of Time, then its propriety, becauſe there is a poſſibility to calculate Time, without knowledge of his motion, ſince we may compute from other operations of Nature, as well as from his, obſervable in creatures guided meerly by ſence; ſo that we only make applicable to our uſe, an effect from a cauſe unknown, therefore this muſt be too low, and mean a definition of time, nor is it poſſible to go far enough from our ſelves, in ſeeking a cauſe ſo obſcure and remote; a man can as well declare his own beginning, with all things elſe, as to go ſo far backward with the world, and find out the original cauſe of our dayes, and ſeaſons, it would be too near an acquaintance with the infinite diſpoſer of all things, and therefore not to be hoped for by mortality.

tality. I would rather define Time the first act of Nature, a universal beginning, and order of things, then a measure of motion, because Time and order, are essentially annext, and if eternity could consist of parts, we might grant it all one with time, because it is not impossible but nature may continue a perpetual motion, and order, to maintain her universal continuance; though when we have united all our best imaginations, we must say of Time, as the Poet saith of fame, *Caput inter nubila condit.* It is hid from our understandings, yet nothing so familiar to our conveniency, and use; the best gratitude we can shew for so excellent a benefit, is, not tot to abuse the hours committed to our lives, and it were a high ingratitude to Providence, if we do otherwise; which hath appointed so sublime a guide to waite upon us, and our occasions; it is much more ours, then society and friends; an assistant each moment at hand, and what creature so little regards it as man, who lives more disorderly, then those he commands, the Ass knows his seasons, and the most inconsiderable creature

is not negligent to improve it, though but to the benefit of ſence: And 'tis ſome wonder to obſerve what intelligence they have with Nature, how they calculate and diſpoſe of times, foreſee the diſturbance of the Ayr, and Elements, and elect out of their Prognoſticks ſeaſons for reſt, ſecurity, and food, to be ſhort there is nothing lives, that playes ſo much the truant with Time, as man doth, as if his hours were given him to be loſt, rather then improved, how ſeldome do we uſe one hour aright, or applyed to its proper uſe, our very meals and ſleep with other exorbitant actions, make day and night to witneſs, that there is not any creature lives ſo diſorderly as man; if it lay in his power, the general order of the Univerſe would be ſoon impared, introducing prepoſterous confuſion in the Æconomy of Nature.

Therefore ſince the right uſe of Time is eſſentially annexed to the orderly regiment of our lives, the beſt moral that can be taken from this Eſſay, is ſo to diſpole of our hours, that all the actions of our life may keep a regularity and decorum with them; he

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must needs be an odd man, that without any indiſpoſition of body, will take his bed, when the Sun hath travelled ſo high as the Meridian, or chuſe rather to journey by the Moonlight, than his; becauſe our affairs are more naturally fitted for day, then for night; and yet there are ſome men as rediculouſly enormous in their manner of living; others I have obſerved and not a few, that even loath the length of their hours, as if they could be content they might be contracted into fewer, or Summers days into Winters, which cannot but proceed from a negligent diſpoſing of their buſineſs, and themſelves; he that will, for the due contemplation of Heaven, and the ſervice of himſelf, ſet a part ſo much of his Time, as his neceſſary occaſions require, ſhall find, that he has little left to be vacant, or idle: This proves the wiſdome of the Ancients, who husbanded nothing better than time, alotting proper hours to every occaſion, I wiſh the example was more the practice of this age, Time being a talent lent us from above, improved by the diligent and wiſe but by the

ſloathful and ignorant as prodigally waſted; it is certain, he ſtands the world and himſelf in ſmall ſtead, who hath little or no imployment for his hours, and what can be more properly wanted, then a man that hath no uſe of himſelf.

Of Alteration and change in things.

THere is not any thing that hath being, but is ſubject to change, for it is the worlds ſubſiſtence, as well as viciſſitude, *Æternitas rerum contrarijs conſtat*, ſayth *Seneca*: If things could ſtand at a ſtay, Nature would ſoon be idle, and at a ſtand, the world is her mighty ſhop, and work-houſe, where all things by her wonderful operations receive change, and tis plain in the courſe of all ſublunary things, ſhe deſtroys all but her ſelf; Time being her great Recorder, to tell us when this or that individual had a beginning, or end, ſo that ſhe is forced to live on the ruine of what ſhe doth

doth produce to preſerve her univerſal ſubſiſtence; without this viciſſitude Time would be a uſeleſs word, and inconſiſtent with the world, becauſe it could keep account of nothing, if every thing was ſtill the ſame; it muſt therefore follow Nature at the heels, who is ſtill undermining her ſmall foundations, to preſerve the greater of the world: Generation and Corruption are the two pillars of her being, and one thing muſt live by the death of another, all her acts are as ſo many murthers, but it is in order to living, and the worlds continuance, there is a ſtrange beauty in her alterations, for ſhe often produces the moſt graceful, and pleaſant things, out of the decay, and corruption of others; The choyceſt Plants are nouriſhed by the putrefaction of other ſubſtances; the food which maintains our life is altered, before it converts to our nouriſhment; the two principles of production are within us, and we ſubſit by generation and corruption, the whole maſs of our bodies with every member of us, decayes, and is as kindly repaired by Nature, each

moment of our lives, our meat and ſuſtenance is converted into blood, our blood into fleſh, our fleſh into bones, and all thoſe conſtantly ſupplyed from a change within us, thus we are eating up our ſelves, before death devours us; tis ſtrange we ſhould not obſerve how familiar death is with us, before we are his, our childhood and youth dye, as well as our manhood and age, and if we continue long enough, we muſt paſs all theſe limits of our dayes, ſince by the intendment of Nature, we live to that purpoſe; how vain are therefore ſuch, who are deſirous of life, yet would avoid old age, many thinking it a reproach to look or be accounted old; certainly Nature could have repreſented our age and decay, otherwiſe then by the wrinckles and furrows of the brow, and face, though we are beholding to her more for putting this check upon our vanities and luſts, then if ſhe had ſuffered us to have continued thoſe incitements of Luxury and Pride; Age being the greater obligement, ſince it abates the exceſſes, and fraylties of youth, and tis ſtrangely redicu'ous

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to obſerve how much it is deſyed by mankind, eſpecially by thoſe of the weaker ſex, tell a woman of her age, and peradventure you make her as deeply bluſh, as if you reproached her for incontinency, or that it were poſſible for her to give Nature the lye, ſo falſly and impertinently are we in love with our ſelves.

There is another kind of alteration, and it is in the manner of our living, or rather the accidental part of mans life, though it gives us not ſeldome a greater concern, then if it were eſſential to our being, how many men are there, who feel more anxiety of mind, for not enjoying the leſs ſubſtantial and tranſitory things of the world, as Riches, Honour and the like; how great are the emulations which theſe exorbitant deſires of life do occaſion, and yet we are not at that degree concern'd, in obſerving the prudence or bodily health of others, though greater then our own; a man in a conſumption, is not ſo meanly envious, as to be greived becauſe another man hath not the like indiſpoſition; in like manner to come nearer our ſelves, we

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do not ſo perplex our thoughts that we are deformed, old, want health, or that we are the tennants at will of life, for what we enjoy, nor for the aſſurance we have of death, and yet we are ſtrangely troubled about theſe circumſtantials of our being, and take it not a little ill of fortune, if we have not unneceſſary greatneſs, and ſuperfluity of eſtate, anſwerable to our deſires; as if the gifts of Nature were leſs deſirable, then thoſe of Fortunes; we unwillingly ſuffer an ebb in theſe, as if providence was obliged to preſerve our conditions unchangeable, though it doth otherwiſe in all things elſe, to which purpoſe *Seneca* ſaith, *Natura autem hoc quod vides, regnum mutationibus temperat, nubila, ſerena ſuccedunt:* our condition of life muſt have riſings and declinations; and there is ſcarce a man whom fortune takes ſo little notice of, as not to make him ſenſible of change, *Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt:* and it is an effect of prudence to be content with what we cannot make better; a good man may ſuffer, what an ill one doth endure; to conclude, the moſt part of mankind, would rather

ther mend providence, then themſelves, which cauſes them to be ſo little contended with the changes it produceth.

Of Cuſtome and Uſage.

CUſtome is not ill defined, to be another Nature, and certainly there is not any thing ſo much miſtreſs of our inclinations, and manners, or that hath ſo long a being with mankind; ſhe is a tutreſs of our childhood, youth, and age, and we ſeem as much hers, as Natures; there is not any thing gives us ſo many burthens, and yet ſo little felt, ſince a continual uſage renders inſenſible the weight it layes on us; we proceed not unlike with Cuſtome, we feel that perhaps more heavy and irkſome at firſt, then we after do by continnal uſe. If a man could perfectly diſcover the Original of our Cuſtomes, and forms of life, we might think time had playd the fool with us, or we with it: How different are the manners of the Indians, Perſians, Moors, both from one

another, as well as in reſpect of ours, inſomuch as their civilities compared with thoſe we uſe, look like ſo many formal mockeries, thus men may laugh at one another, and yet not agree, which is the greateſt fool? How many are the different uſages of mankind in converſe, Manners, eating, drinking, in Marriages, Funerals, as likewiſe in Religion, and other things of moment; tis no ſmal amazement to read ſtories of this kind, in which the actions of men, ſeem not more prepoſterous to one another, then if ſome ſhould make uſe of the tayle of the horſe, and ride backwards, whilſt others are carried with their faces forward, and perhaps the world hath preſidents of this kind; there are people I have read of, that move their bodies backward, *Kim Kam*, to ours in common civilities; others that place their hands on the ground, when we kiſs ours in tender of our ſalvations, and yet judge themſelves not leſs accompliſhed, then we conceive our ſelves to be; ſome feed on mans fleſh, and think it the beſt nouriſhment, becauſe neareſt of nature to our own; others

others, devour their deareſt friends and relations, as an act of kindneſs to them, that they may be that way converted into their own ſubſtances; others that can by Uſe digeſt raw fleſh, which we eate boyled and roaſted; others in the coldeſt parts of the world (like the ancient Brittains and Picts) can go naked, and ſleep on the ground, as well as we can upon our Quilts, and Feather beds, performing all theſe acts without any detriment to their healths: by which we may perceive the power of Cuſtome, which makes extream difficulties to ſome men, familiar to others: It hath been a Cuſtome in ſome parts of the world, for men to marry their ſiſters, and daughters, as the moſt natural expreſſion of love; another to burn, or bury alive the friends and ſervants with the corps of the deceaſed, and this embraced chearfully by thoſe that are to ſuffer; beſides all theſe, how many diverſities of Religion doth the world abound with, and for which theirs litle reaſon to be given, but the force of Cuſtome, and Education; here hath been enough inſtanced in general to

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ſhew the power of Uſage, moſt of which, have had a long continuance in the world, and ſome of them practiſed at this day; and it is remarkable, that Time which by degrees changes the manners of men, and things, proceeds more ſlowly in the abolishing of Cuſtomes, then in any other ſubject of mutation, the reaſon is, becauſe they plead a right and veneration from Time, for which reaſon they get the ſtart of us, ſome ages before they are brought to the teſt of reaſon; the preſent age being alwayes apt to beleive, out of reſpect to antiquity, that they had a more wiſe beginning, then perhaps they had: if we conſider the Priſtine manners and Uſages of our remote Anceſtors, we ſhall find, that ours, at this day differ as much from them, as theirs did from ſuch as the *Americans* practice; as for the things of Religion, they had no knowledge of what we profeſs, therefore there needs no particular inſtance to that purpoſe, and yet there is reaſon enough to ſuppoſe, they wanted no reverence of a divine power, ſo far as the works of Nature manifeſteth, of

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whom there could not reaſonably be more expected; but in other things, perhaps more prudent, then we are in this age; how much leſs were our antient predeceſſors the Brittains and Saxons, given to exceſs in dyet and apparel, then we appear to be in this age, which could not but be advantageous to their ſtrength of mind, and body, and doubtleſs we have many debaucheries and practices amongſt us, which may well paralel the worſt of thoſe we call barbarous in them; the attribute of barbarous being an uſurpation in men, and rather created to magnifie themſelves, then having any juſt authority over others; thus did the Græcians firſt, and the Romans afterwards, reproach the world to elevate the opinion of their manners: as there is nothing that deſerves a better eſteem for being new, ſo there is not any thing the worſe for being old.

There are ſome conſtitiutions that ſhew rather the device and abuſe of perticular men, then the approbation and conſent of Law-makers, or body of a people, becauſe they are too ex-

travagant for any publick reaſon to ſubmit to: and here lies a great exception againſt Cuſtomes of this ſort, for indeed they make us go, as it were backward with Nature, not unlike the ſtory I have ſomewhere read of a man, that being obſerved whiping his Father, and being rebuked for ſo doing, excus'd the act by ſaying, *That his father had done as much for his Grandfather, and that therefore it was juſtice to continue the ſame Uſage to him*: And certainly when any thing, (having the greateſt reputation of uſage and long continuance) doth not improve, but rather derogate from the due order, and reſpects of Nature and humane ſociety, there is no doubt, but in that caſe it were a high miſdemeanour, and crime, to continue it, as alſo, all ſuch which have a right from Tyranny or Luſt; there is a pertinent example of the laſt in the *marcheta mulieris*, paid at this day (as I take it) in ſome parts of *Scotlana*, by which the odiouſneſs of the Uſage in proſtituting their daughters to their Princes beds, is purchaſed off: Thus when Cuſtomes of evil beginning and practice

ctice cannot wholly be abrogated, it is good policy to reform and alter their course by some fit expedient, like a discreet travellour, who having a journey to ride, will rather break out of the road to escape now and then a durty lane, then continually pass all he meets with; there is nothing more reasonable, then to reject the continuance of any thing, that is inconvenient and cumbersome to Nature, and yet we see that the power of usage doth over rule men and law, as also the most unlimited Princes; they may violate the latter, but are forced to submit to the tyranny of the former: how tedious and impertinent are the formes and Customary, solemnities of Princes, appertaining to their dignity and state, such as would tire the observance of one of their Pages, which though they are not to be numbred amongst the weighty, and important cares of a Crown, yet doubtless they are of much concern to its ease and quiet: Custome is a Mistress, that is every where courted and commands, and there is not any thing which hath a superiour veneration;

tion; for we may obſerve, it hath ſomething the better of Religion it ſelf: How many times have our beleifs been totally changed, or altered, while our Uſages and manners have remayned the ſame; as if mankind had ſomewhat more to ſay for the one, then for the other, although there is no controverſy more difficult to be determined amongſt men, then who have the beſt, ſince every nation will reaſon for their own; and if the world would admit ſuch a general Councel in order to Cuſtomes, as it hath ſometimes done in matters of Faith, the deciſion, and reformation, might not be leſs effectual, and doubtleſs the irregularities and abuſes of the former, would be found as many, as any have been, or can be alledged to have crept into the latter, it being not impoſſible, that ſuch an univerſal authority might accompliſh that, which no one part of the world ſhall ever bring to paſs; and that could not prove an unwiſe conformity, which renders men more agreeable to one another, but ſince this is not to be expected, the beſt means that can be

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uſed, is for every nation wiſely to redreſs the enormities of their manners and Cuſtomes.

Of Religion.

THe reaſon that mankind hath to be good, is ſo powerful from the morality and dictates of Nature, that he needs no greater argument to convince him, then a true ſence of himſelf; but to be Religious, he muſt go farther off, and above his capacities, ſince he muſt not only contemplate himſelf, but find an object fit for his Devotion; and doubtleſs according to this method, men did in general proceed to be Religious, though wanting other revelation; nor can it be denyed that men had not a being ſome ages in many parts of the world, before any of the Religions at this day profeſſed, were known or had reception amongſt them: yet even then it were irrational to conclude, they worſhipt nothing, becauſe the perſwaſions in themſelves muſt induce it;

it; nor could man reasonably contemplate his own being here, with the wonderful subsistence of the world, and not acknowledge something more excellent than all this, because his thoughts could not have any reasonable satisfaction otherwise, and it was impossible for him to terminate and limit them to himself, though otherwise, then by the eye of Reason, he cannot find any thing more excellent. Whence it is evident, that from the due esteem and reverence which man had of the excellence of his own being, and capacities of his nature, above all other creatures, that he became Religious, for he could not have been reasonable, or dignified above them otherwise; nor is it enough to argue, that because we command them, that therefore we have a preheminence of reason, since we do as much in effect, in the prerogative we have over our servants, and slaves; the Horse or the Ass is not a greater drudge, then we make them, and they want not sence to obey our wills, proper to their uses, but they want thought to valew and embelish their Natures, like us, and above all

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cannot be religious or expreſs any action like it, from the reſult of reaſon; according to which, *Ovid* elegantly ſaith, *Os homini ſublime dedit cælumque videre &c.* And I judge there is no greater argument to be made, that beaſts are inferiour to us in reaſon, but that they have none at all; though there be not a few, that will argue for their having of underſtanding according to their natures, in an equal proportion with ours, for if they had, they would give ſome evidence of this kind, as well as men, ſince it is the moſt ſublime imployment of thought; who can perceive that a horſe hath more eſteem for a ſtar, then a molehil, or the ground he feeds on, whilſt we diſtinguiſh all theſe according to their ſeveral beings, and perfections, whence we may conclude that man only is religious from thought and the contemplation of his own, and the worlds being; nor could it be poſſible to perſwade, that there was any ſuch thing as Providence, did he not perceive it manifeſt in the order of Nature: I have often wondred why the ancient Philoſophers

took ſo much pains to prove a divine power or providence; ſince the world hath ſo manifeſt a ſubſiſtence from it; we behold the Sun ſetting and riſing, without being able to give ſuch an account of his motion, as that he ſhould of neceſſity return to us, or why we have never yet been deſtitute of his light one day; we cannot aſſure our ſelves, that becauſe we had the bleſſing of his light to day, we are therefore certain he ſhall do the ſame to morrow, ſo that there needs no argument to be made for Providence, ſince it demonſtrates it ſelf.

The beleif of one God, which is the firſt Article of our Creed, hath not been only the beleif of the wiſeſt of the Philoſophers (ſuch as *Hales*., *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, with many others of the moſt eminent for learning and virtue) but hath likewiſe been the conſtant beleif and tradition of the world; haveing been alwaies the beſt reaſon of mankind, as well as their faith, and though ſome men are pleaſed to expreſs their beleif rather with the notions of Providence, of Nature, a divine mind and order, in the diſpoſition

on and government of the world, they are but ſo many ſeveral words of one ſignification: It is true there have been ſome (though their number comparatively is not great) who have profeſſed the beleif and worſhip of many gods, as we find ſome of the antient Greeks and Romans did, though magnanimous nations, but if it were well examined, it will appear that the introducing the beleif of many gods, was rather the deceipts of particular men, or perhaps the intereſt and pollicy of Governments to introduce a multiplicity of ſuperſtitions and gods; we may be ſure otherwiſe that ſo wiſe a people as the Romans were, and the Græcians had been before them, would never have permitted ſo many ridiculous obſervances and worſhips, though in effect it was no more then a repetition of many times one, as in Arithmatick we find an Unite to be no number, becauſe it neither admits multiplication into more, or being devided will be leſs, then an unite ſtill, and yet all number is but the ſumme of ſo many units put together; ſo did the Antients do in their beleif of gods,

that is, their beleif could ſignifie no more then a repetition of one God, though they gave in an account of many. It would be endleſs to reckon how many vain ſuperſtitions the world hath had, of which there is no age but is found fruitful, mankind having never wanted zeal and religious curioſity to further ſome beleif or other: but what is moſt to be admir'd, is, that the moſt vain groſs and ridiculous worſhips and beleifs, have been as ſtrongly patronized, as any of the moſt ingenious and refined, which is ſome evidence, that men have been much to ſeek in finding out a way of worſhip, and cannot but give an occaſion of this *Quære*, how mankind came to be ſo much puzled, and at a loſs in not diſcovering one only true and demoſtrative Religion, when they had been infallibly convicted, that there was one God, one Providence, or one divine power univerſally to be beleived, and thus have an equal aſſurance of the truth of all other Articles of their faith, as they have of the firſt in beleiving one God, which was the beginning of moſt antient Creeds, as well

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as ours, at this day: I know there have been ſome (not of the leaſt capacities) who have made a ſtrong hæſitation heer, as if they were unwilling to keep any Religion longer company, or beleive farther then that one Article extends to, becauſe they affirm that all other Articles which are beleived (notwithſtanding the moſt infallible pretences whatſoever) have not the ſame indiſputable evidence, and power on their underſtandings. To ſatisfy the weight of this objection is not eaſy, becauſe it muſt be granted, that all perſwaſions of Religion whatſoever, were ſomething later acknowledged by the world, then that firſt univerſal Article of Faith, and beleif of a deity, or ſome divine power equivalent to it, which is as clear to our reaſons, as the world we behold, the order and government of which doth ſufficiently confirm it every minute of our lives: neither can we juſtly brand ſuch for Atheiſts, or Nullifidians, who go no further with us, in our journey to Heaven, then the firſt Article of our Creed extends to, becauſe, they require a like validity of propoſi-

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tion for the reſt, ſince he may prove himſelf to be religious without aſſenting to any particular perſwaſion; the beleif only that there is a God, or divine power, being ſo far his juſtification; we muſt therefore of neceſſity be content with what we receive, and judge the beſt; If all other Religions ſhould exactly aſſent to this one ſupream verity with us Chriſtians, and likewiſe practiſe with us all other excellent precepts tending to morallity, and piety, though they would not beleive the Article of Incarnation, I ſhould think they profeſſed and practiſed a good ſhare of our Commandments and beleif, though they held them deliverd from different traditions, and teachers: and were the world ſo wiſely devout as to comply but thus far, the name of Jew, Chriſtian, Mahometan, with all other different beleivers, could not be ſo ridiculous and odious to each others conſcience, it being reaſonable to diſpenſe ſomewhat where education and cuſtome have been long prevalent, but there are ſome ſo furiouſly bent to perſue and maintain the vain Enthuſi-

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aſms of their brains, that they will *vi & armis* (ſo far as lies in their power) eſtabliſh their novel opinions and doctrines, and like *Diomedes* in the Fable, rather be at ennity and combate with all other perſwaſions, then not introduce their own; acting all things furiouſly, as if it were Religion to murther men, for religions ſake, or that men ought to be compelled to embrace what their Reaſons cannot ſubmit to, and ſo *martemque accendere cantu*: Not unlike a Sect I have read of amongſt the Mahometans, who judge it the moſt expedient way to gain Paradiſe, to kill ſome one of a contrary religion: me thinks the blind Fanatick zeal of this generation may be likened to the deſcription of Fortune, ſince they act all things as it were furiouſly, and by chance; the late civil war hath given us ſuch a proof of theſe men, that their actions do exceed all Satyr that can be written againſt them; the Doctrines of our Church having been ſo diſordered by them, that it is as difficult to ſettle mens beleifs in that concord and order they profeſſed formerly, as it

was to put right the Sybils leaves when blown up and down by the wind; but this hath cheifly relation to our infelicity at home, though it hath been the common diſtemper of the world in all ages paſt, to be ever introducing of doctrines and worſhips, which by degrees do undermine and pull down the old, erecting on their ruines ſome new models of faith, to allure ſuch as delight in novelties, who are generally the greateſt part of men, by which means war and deſtruction have been not ſeldome introduced to the ruine of mighty States and Empires; nor is the ſucceſs to be wondred at, ſince novelties in Religion are very ſeldome unwelcome to the generallity of mankind, becauſe out of ignorance or miſtake they are perſwaded they may improve their beleifs, and ſo make themſelves better, ſuch good huſbandry in point of Faith the world hath, and will alwaies incline to affect; ſome endeavour to juſtifie the Tenents of Religion by diſputing, but doubtleſs a miſtake, ſince there is not any thing which hath ſo ſtrong a Foundation, that controverting will not

not weaken, or undermine, for what admits of diſputation, doth in a manner grant it may be doubted, we cannot be more prudently concerndin the juſtification of our own, then by comparing the goodneſs of its doctrines & precepts, with what the reſt of mankind hath, and doth practice, nor need we doubt of our aboundant ſatisfaction; and I dare affirm, if all disbeleivers of Chriſtianity would impartially conſider the high morallities and excellency of its doctrines, comparatively with theirs, they muſt needs acknowledge our profeſſion to be the beſt, though they did not beleive one Arcle of our Faith, for though it be hard to demonſtrate our Creed, (ſince we muſt be forced to plead cuſtome and tradition, things of ſmall weight with others, who have arguments of the ſame kind to ſay for their own) it is not difficult to ſhew its obligements on the conſcience, to be more refin'd, and excellent, then any other, ſtanding in compariſon with it, and doubtleſs it is no ſmall conqueſt of our Faith to have ſo much the better of all other in the world.

Of Freindſhip.

THe greateſt bleſſing of Life, conſiſts in *Freindſhip*, ſince it is not eaſie to be happy without it; and certainly a generous Perſon would aſſoon live without a Soul, as without a Freind, while that doth beſt expreſs the value of his, who is ever more zealous to continue the *Freindſhip* he hath placed, then to court an eſteem from the World: The virtues of *Freindſhip* have expreſſed no ſmall part of the Magnanimity and Glory of the moſt renowned *Greeks* and *Romans*, *Alexander* had his *Epheſtion*, *Cæſar* his *Brutus*, how many ingenuous Epiſtles and Diſcourſes have *Cicero* and *Seneca* wrote on this ſubject, to teach the world the worth and perfection of it: it is the Loadſtone of the Soul, that draws us to one another, and certainly there is a greater Sympathy in *Freindſhip*, then in all other of our affections, it brings our volatile inclinations to be fixed, and terminated in the enjoyment of a Friend, whoſe Soul is as

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it were his in another Body; and though love hath a Superlative command on our inclinations, and no leſs then one of the moſt noble attributes of *Freindſhip*, the laſt muſt be ſtill the *ſummum genus*, while the other is but a ſpecies derived from it: a man may be eſteemed and beloved of another for his Wit, Eloquence and Learning, or for his diſpoſition, gracious manners, or as he is otherwiſe obliged by him, and yet not merit the name of Freind, thus love can arrive at moſt but at higheſt *Freindſhip*, and doubtleſs it doth not alwayes hold a reciprocation with it, for the object of it is ſomewhat more general; it is eaſie to obſerve how our affections do not alwayes concenter with it, I may have an Obligation to love, where I may not think the Perſon worthy to be intituled Freind, as in the Caſes of Duty, and ſuch we are obliged to by our Relations one to another, while that conſiſts in a greater perfection, and hath no other Obligation on us, but it ſelf: and *Freindſhip* (in its due perfection) hath the nobleſt intendments of virtue, ſince only that

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can be the end of it, amongſt ſuch as are good, who otherwiſe will not conſent to draw up ſuch honourable Indentures, that oblige their Souls to one another, *Amicitia non niſi inter bonos*, ſaith the Philoſopher ; there muſt be a reciprocal commucation of Virtues, that muſt continue and fix it. The world is full of ſuch who have intimate correſpondencies and familiar converſe one with another, yet never arrive to the perfection of *Freindſhip*, or have ſcarce any Act of it in their thoughts ; it being frequent with ſuch, to profeſs great endearments one day, and be at defiance another, either out of depravedneſs of Nature, or that they deſigned to themſelves ſome unworthy end, which an indifferent Judgement may ſoon perceive ; neither is there any thing more difficult, then for ill men to have any ſincere, or permanent accord, becauſe their vicious inclinations and habits are ever oppoſing the virtue and effects of *Freindſhip* : Tis no wonder that the world hath ſo few worthy examples of this kind, when the qualifications in men muſt be ſo excellent to compleat them,

them; for it muſt be a ſweet temperament of mind, and as it were a harmony of virtues, that can make *Freindſhip* either acceptable, or honourable; I remmember a pertinent expreſſion to this purpoſe that was told me as the uſual ſaying of a worthy and diſcreet Gentleman, which was, that he did not know were to find a true Freind, there is nothing more difficult to be found amongſt men, as by our own experience, & the reaſons here mentioned, is obvious to conclude; and it is ſtrange to obſerve, how prepoſtereous and unjuſtly the affections of men are beſtowed, inſomuch that we ordinarily perceive that good men are deſtitute of thoſe favours and Obligations from others, which the bad are more frequently gratified with, either becauſe men are ignorant in their choyce, or that the inſinuations of the Vicious are more prevalent and induſtrious, which is very common to be noted, while a man of honeſt and worthy Principles, looks rather to be ſought for, then to make an Application to be known what he is, and certainly the unworthy diligence of men of diſſolute and diſhoneſt

neſt Principles, doth not ſeldome work themſelves into the favour of Princes of the beſt diſpoſitions, who are not ſuſpicious of thoſe defects, the world perceives in them: there are ſome ſort of Natures, that can never hold long any fair quarter with Freindſhip, but they will be either abuſing or deſtroying of it, ſuch are the Ambitious or Vain-glorious, (for vain-glory hath ever ſome ambition or other annexed to it) the Proud, the Covetous, the Indiſcreet, the Debauched, and ſuch like; For the firſt I name the Ambitious, who are ſo little at reſt with themſelves, and are in ſuch a ſtorm with the world, in order to perfecting their deſigns, which very often are full of turbulency to themſelves and others, that it is almoſt impoſſible to find with thoſe any proper calm for Freindſhip, which requires the greateſt evenneſs and tranquility of mind and diſpoſition: As to the next, the Freind of a Proud man, is ever in danger of ſome undervaluing or other, it being natural for men of that humour to contemn all but themſelves, and the beſt of their kindneſs for the moſt part huth ſuch a mixture and tincture

ćture of Arrogancy, as their greateſt Obligations are rendred ſcurvy, and even loathed by a worthy Receiver. Nor doth the Proud man beſtow a benefit leſs offenſive or ungraciouſly, then man of an arrogant and haughty humour, receives the favours of Freindſhip, to which purpoſe *Seneca* hath this expreſſion

Quidem non tantum dant beneficium ſuperbe ſed etiam accipiunt.

As if they would expreſs their ingratitude before hand, or were too great to be obliged; and moſt aſſuredly men of this humour, are ſo elated, and have ſuch a high value for themſelves in their imaginations, that they ſet themſelves at too great a diſtance for the value of others, there being required to Freindſhip more of a level in diſpoſition, and there is no wiſe man, will endeavour to oblige, where the return may be either neglect or ſcorn: For the Covetous, the Philoſopher gives this ſentence againſt him, *Nullus avarus verus amicus*; and doubtleſs there is ever this caution of him, that he

he will be trueſt to his gain, and therefore his Freind muſt look well to himſelf, that he be not Merchandized by him, and I beleive there was never any man ſordidly retentive and covetous, that did ever deſerve a name of that worthy import; for the two laſt, as they are the moſt inconſiderable to gain a value or reſpect, ſo there is no prudent perſon, that needs an admonition to avoid them, he will be ſure not to have ſo much a familiarity with ſuch, much leſs a firm amity and intimacy with his Soul, for to a fooliſh man it were unworthily committed, whoſe capacities can neither merit, or preſerve it; as on the other ſide, it were vicioufly placed with debauched and ignominious Perſons; the laſt of theſe would be the greater Errour in our Judgement and choyce, ſince there is requiſite to Freindſhip, more Goodneſs and Virtue, then dexterity of wit, or heigth of underſtanding, it being enough that men have ſufficient Prudence, to be as good as they ſhould be, in order to the compleating of a virtuous Freindſhip; and doubtleſs the honour of Freindſhip,

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like that in Heraldry, is moſt great and perfect, when it is plaineſt repreſented; whereas the moſt uſual correſpondencies and intimaces of men, are only blazon'd with the Ornaments and Guildings of words, which are no more really intended theirs, then if the Air could challeng them in which they are ſpoke: neither is a too univerſal communication of *Freindſhip*, conſiſtent with the nature and perfection of it: which gives it a diſtinction from Charity, for the laſt is of a more general Nature, a man may have Charity for mankind at large, though not poſſible to have a *Freindſhip* for all men; the latter conſiſting more in Unity, yet not wanting the excellency of the former, as all Numbers are derived from one, which makes Millions, ſo *Freindſhip* doth but contract the vaſter ſummes of Love and Charity: Whoſoever is an excellent Freind, cannot want due Charity, and yet the Univerſal objects of our Charities, are not fit for the relation of Freinds, becauſe it is an uniting the affections of two Souls in one, whilſt in this Caſe we

may oblige in a high nature, yet not judge the obliged worthy to be accounted Freinds ; t'was ingenuously said, that he that is every bodies Freind, is no bodies Freind, for he seems to every man, the Worlds, more then his whilst Freinship as is already expressed, requires an intireness and unity : it is strange to observe, that men of difficult and rigid Natures, are often more strict in their Freindships, then such as are more familiar, and easie of manners and converse, the Reason is, because their Inclinations being so few, they better Sympathize with this affection : there is nothing of higher concernment then to contract prudently a Relation of this kind, and it requires a great curiosity, and judgement, in chusing such Objects of our affections, that must partake our Cares, and assist our Judgements: as he that hath a small Study of Books, so they are good, is better able out of them to assist his understanding, then another, who hath a greater number of indifferent or ill ones ; thus should we do in the choyce

choyce of our Freinds, no matter how few we call ours, ſo they are diſcreet and virtuous.

Of Fame.

THere is ſomething monſtrous and incredulous in the nature of *Fame*, and therefore we may beſt take her definition from the Poet.

Illa Terra parens, ira irritae Deorum,
Extremum (ut perhibent) Cæo, Enceladique ſororem.
Progenuit, pedibus celerem, & pernicibus alis.

And yet notwithſtanding this ſtrange, though juſt Deſcription of her, ſhe is the general Idol of mankind, for ſhe hath a Devotion more or leſs from men of all Conditions, and Religions; neither is there found any perſon ſo humbly virtuous, as to exerciſe its Acts without any deſire or expectation of Praiſe, Virtue being ſeldome diſpleaſed to be honoura-

bly treated and divulged, for whatsoever is good, is the better for being communicable: A man may Contemplate of Virtue in solitude and retirement, but the Practical and Moral part (which is indeed the most useful) consists in its participation, and the Society it hath with others: and it cannot be denied but desire of Fame and Repute, hath brought Virtue more on the Stage of the World, for without praise, the Spurrs would be wanting to incite mens Actions unto virtuous Courses, who otherwise would be Sluggish, and Morose, had the World no Garlands of glory to bestow: there are but few, who are not ambitious of praise, though tis the reproach of Fame, when tis bestowed on such as do not merit it, or want due accomplishments to deserve it; the Vainglorious and Ambitious man will alwayes be troubling himself and the world, to have it, though none of his right, and thus the Trumpet of Fame is sometimes blown the wrong way; such men have often a strong popular breath to favour their windy Imaginations, the

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voice of Fame being ſeldome without ſuch like commixtures, ſo that there is nothing more abuſes the world then Fame; ſuch as rely on her favour, are ſure to be abuſed by her Reports, let them be never ſo deſerving: it may well be called the Worlds general Malady, for it renders mankind diſtempered in the purſuit of it, who ſicken as it were by a longing deſire to attain to Repute and Glory, and when all this is done with their utmoſt labour and peril, ſhe advances but a few to continue her Favourites long; and therefore a Prudent man will not beſtow much of his addreſſes and courtſhip on Fame, who like ſome fickle and partial Miſtreſs, is ever variable and perverſe in her favours, ſhe ſmiles to day, and frowns to morrow; and it is very wonderful to obſerve, what an expedition, report (that wild voice of the world) uſes to advance or depreſs the reputations of Men.

I remember a Gentleman of Honour (who had relation to the Court of the late King) would ask with much concern, what was the rea-

ſon, that a man was thought an honeſt man to day, and a knave to morrow; he made this queſtion as he was a Courtier, and in order to ſome incertainties of favour and repute of that kind; indeed the malice of Fame is no where more buſy, then with the ears of Princes: it may as well be demanded of the world in general, how tis poſſible, reports ſhould be ſo ſuddenly different in the caſe of mankind, whilſt by them we hourely prove the reputations of men ſo variouſly and unjuſtly conveyed, inſomuch, that if we give credit to them, we may ſometimes take the bad for the good, the fooliſh for the wiſe, the cowardly for the valiant, and in all things taken on truſt from reports, by which men are vainly entitled to ſuch merits, they are ſtrangers to themſelves; Fame keeping ſuch a legend that if it be ſtrictly looked into, there will be found ſome dignified without any great degree of ſupererrogation; it is ſtrange to obſerve that a ſmall deſert (take it in whatſoever one will) ſhall ſometimes give a man a

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greater repute, then any merit or action of a far transcendent nature: And yet notwithstanding these unjust prerogatives of Fame, we shall find the world still trucking for her favours, like some adultress who is woed more for her beauty, then virtue, while such as are fond of her honours, will desire to be thought her creatures, though they are more discoursed of then admired; some are so in love with the valew, which they have for themselves, as they will set Fame forward with their own votes first, *Populus mihi sibilat, at mihi plaudo* saith *Plautus*:

There are others (though not so many) who are not so much in love with praise as to be on the Theater of applause, or to be known for those accomplishments which are justly their due; and this, if it proceeds not from a rigidness of nature and pride, is magnanimous and wise, such a man being willing to allow himself an esteem so far, as the prudence of his judgement complies with, without being further beholding to the world, and is rich of himself, without borrowing from the repute

which is given him by others: certainly men pay for nothing so dear as the brocage of Fame, what will not the Vain-glorious and Ambitious give to purchase her Pageantries, or men generally to have the reputation they desire, and thirst after, and yet no man can be ignorant how unjustly she hath used her most Obsequious followers: how many are buried in Obscurity and Oblivion, who ought to have been most conspicuous in her Records; It hath been more the good fortune of *Alexander*, *Iulius Cæsar*, and others that they receive from her so glorious a remembrance at this day, then any delight she hath to to eternize their Names, whilst such numbers are forgotten by her, as might perhaps equal the glory of these: Doubtless tis a strange Text hand, that Fame writes in, for her Characters seem greatest at distance, or as if it were possible to behold her Landskips most removed from the Eye, and yet her Figures are still greatest: in such proportion doth she deal with men of past Ages, for though she seems to be in love with

antiquity, ſhe doth often give us falſe Meaſures, and Proportions, of mens Actions in times paſt, and doubtleſs it is ſome argument againſt traditions of the moſt ancient and venerable repute, ſince they are in ſome ſort beholding to the Tongue of Fame, which gives no certain account of truths near hand, much leſs of ſuch as were many Ages diſtant from our knowledge; We may therefore thus adviſe our ſelves concerning Fame, let us ſtrive rather to deſerve good report, then vainly and immoderately to ſeek her; In the firſt we do our ſelves Juſtice without her, in the latter, whilſt we endeavour to attain exceſs of praiſe, tis odds but ſhe derides our endeavours, permitting us only to wear ſo much of her Livery, as may repreſent us the Fools of Fame.

Of Detraction

THe moſt malevolent diſpoſition in man is Detraction, ſince it perſecutes the good Name and repute of others, and is ever converting the beſt things into the worſt Uſes, like the Spider that ſucks poyſon, where the Bee gathers Honey; the definition of Fame taken in the moſt evil ſence, may well ſuit in general with Detraction, ſince this depraved inclination doth abuſively imploy a good part of the Eyes and Ears of the World; thus Fame is no ſooner on her way, but Detraction follows at her heels, leaſt there ſhould be ſo much Candour in her reports, as that any thereby ſhould have the juſtice and praiſe, which belongs to their merit: Certainly no Action of man hath ſo great a Soul of malice in it, as to endeavour by diſhoneſt and unjuſt Slanders to abate the eſteem of others; ſuch endeavours tending to the murther of mans good Name, which

which is the nobleſt part of life, and therefore ſo much the more ungenerous and inhumane : thus is the quality of this paſſion very remarkable, for we may perceive the venome of it moſt imployed againſt the principal virtues in men, ſuch as are reſiding in their Souls, rather then a prejudice to any bodily reſpects of life ; and thus few are found ſo much the marks of Envy and Detraction, becauſe they are of more Illuſtrious birth or more rich in poſſeſſions and the external bleſſings of life, then others, or that they have more perſonal Graces (the latter being the more frequent and vain competition of women, then an imployment worthy the thoughts of men,) but as they are thought accompliſhed in Virtue, or other eminent tranſcendent Gifts of the mind ; ſo if a man be eſteemed in any great degree more Wiſe, more Learned, or more Valient then another, it kindles an Ambition in the Detractor to debaſe his eſteem, it being uſually the deſign and hope of ſuch as are of this vile inclination, to advance clandeſtinely their

their own value, as they derogate from the esteem of others, as if they would have the world understand, it did them wrong, because it did others right; and doubtless there are few men so strongly byassed this way, as those are, who would be thought most excellent in that which they will not allow to be the desert of others, for it must necessarily incite the greatest and most maligne Detraction, where men stand upon Comparisons: Thus if we observe the lower degrees of men we shall find the meanest Science and Profession, hath its Emulatours and detractors; the greatest mechanick would not by his good will have an equal, much less a superiour, so that what the Poet said elegantly in comparing the ambitions of *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, *Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem, Pompejusve parem*, represents not more truly their Characters, then the lowest of mankind. Envy is the general contagion of the soul, there being few to be found clear of this infection; and it is a strange entertainment of the mind, to be delighted with its own pollutions,

ons, or nouriſh a paſſion that muſt be ſo monſtrous as to feed on the defects of others: The beſt antidote that can be given to cure this malady, is to judge wiſely our own defects, and to think humbly of our own deſerts, ſetting the leaſt valew on them, that we may yeild the greater eſteem to the merits of others; if men could thus reſolve with themſelves, aſſuredly there would not be ſo many diſtempered with envy and detraction.

Thus far of this paſſion as it hath a perticular relation, there is another effect of it, which is more daring and publick; as when the government of a State or Monarchy is fallen into contempt or made the object of popular envy, for then Detraction grows to be monſtrous, as is the many headed Beaſt the multitude, who generally welcome all reports, that derogate from the honour of their Governours, or at leaſt contract it furiouſly againſt ſuch, that are the ſubordinate Miniſters, which is the reaſon that all commotions of this kind, begin with their ruine firſt: and Princes are not ſeldome content, if

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it doth end ſo, when there is no other way to Skreen themſelves, or to aſſwage and gratifie the furious diſcontents of the vulgar, whoſe breath (like Winds) makes the ſtrongeſt Guſts againſt ſuch as ſtand higheſt; he that would beſt avoid theſe rough attaques of ſlander, muſt be content to build on a ſmall Foundation of greatneſs, for there is ſuch an Ambition and force in this paſſion, that it commonly wounds ſuch moſt, who are in the higheſt Sphear of honour and reputation.

Beſides theſe, there is a ſort of publick Detraction, which proceeds from a Politick ingratitude, as when a Republick or Monarch, hath thought fit to leſſen and abate the merits of ſome eminent Perſons, out of the apprehenſion of their being too Popular or Ambitious; of which more ſhall be ſaid, when we Treat particularly of ingratitude. In the mean time this may be ſaid of Detraction, that it is one of the worſt productions of Envy, the elder Twin of ingratitude, ſince no man can be highly

ly ungrateful, but must have a great quantity of this vice. Its concomitant, for there is no part he can act so plausibly in his own excuse, as that of a secret Detractor: If it were possible to strip malice of all its appurtenances and slanders, it might well be allowed to be the best Informer, since we are sure, that such (where they have prejudice) will speak home to truth, but we must take care in this Case, that they come no further then the Bar, to give Evidence, for if they shall be allowed to give Judgement, we may expect an unjust and malitious Sentence.

Of Pride and Self-conceit.

IF *Lucifer* was not fallen, and that all the rest of the Celestial Bodies were of his haughty Nature, Pride could not Reign more universally then it doth, there being no Horoscope or Position of the Heaven and Stars, but produces men that are swelled with this passion: it may be called the

the Dropſie of the mind, ſince the moſt, who are thus inclined, have as it were every Vein of their Souls puffed up and ſwelled, by their windy and indigeſted imaginations of themſelves; a humour ſo abounding, that neither the heats of *Spain*, nor the coldneſs of other Climes can leſſen it; neither do I judge it any commendation to the *Spaniard* that he hath taught his Pride a ſtricter form, and method, then is practiſed in ſome other Nations; A Horſe may be eſteemed for his ſtately and haughty carriage, but that a man ſhould take delight in a (*grand Paſs*,) is at beſt, but a ſober way of being ridiculous, and there muſt needs be a ſcurvineſs in this paſſion, when it is only commendable in a Beaſt; certainly Pride is a deformity of the Soul, and if it puts on the moſt gratious and nobleſt Ornaments, 'twill hardly obſcure its being miſhapen and awry; ſome hold that it is ſome defence to Virtue, becauſe they judge that haughty Perſons, will not ſo eaſily ſubmit to the allurements of vice, as having it in greater

greater awe, and more ſtrongly guarding the Approaches, this bold Enemy of mankind doth make; to which it may be anſwered, that if Pride be taken for a due greatneſs and magnanimity of mind, it is unqueſtionably true, otherwiſe very erroneous, for though there is a Vigilancie and Eagerneſs in Pride, to perſue its Inclinations, yet I judge that the golden Fleece of virtue cannot be ſafely guarded by this Dragon, ſince there are ſo many Charms and Allurements to withdraw its Vigilancy; neither is it to be doubted, but the Actions of proud Perſons, do generally tend to an exorbitant and heightned Luxury, as is evident in the Ambitious, the Vain-glorious, the Epicure, the Effeminate, and the like, in all of whom, there is an Emulation and Pride to be moſt Superlative in every of their exceſſes; If Pride be an ingredient of Virtue, it is more to be allowed in the temperament of haughty women, who very rarely prove the daughters of Chaſtity, tis true there are many of theſe, that can put a Grandeur

State upon their vitious affections, perhaps to design a great Man or Prince for their embrace, rather then a Page or Groom, which is but the aspiring of Vice, and renders it the more inglorious, for being more stately and artificial, Pride being like paint applied to the Face, it may imitate some Colours, and Features, but hath seldome under it a good complexion, and it is very difficult to give Pride such a temper, as it may be a Cordial to the Heart, in withstanding the impetuous assaults of Vice, and not rather prove its Infection and Disease: doubtless there is generally a very great meanness of Soul, that doth concenter with this passion, as is evident in the most haughty and aspiring Men, what will not they submit to in order to their ambitious ends? How meanly will they fawn and flatter! insomuch that Pride, so it may ascend, can be content to make use of the lowest Steps, as was evident in *Cataline* and *Iulius Cæsar*, the latter of whom was much more accomplished and virtuous then the first, yet could

could be content to aſpire by as indirect means.

There is another effect of this paſſion, which is Self-conceit, and is the Imbecillity of it; For whereas there are ſome Natures, out of being Conſcious of their own merits and the eſteem they claim, appear to be haughty and arrogant as if they contemned the World, for not giving them ſuch acknowledgments, as they judge due to their deſerts; ſo on other ſide, there is found a greater part of mankind, who with far more vanity and preſumption, challenge a Superlative perfection in all eſtimable qualities and virtues, ſuch are Opiniators, and Self-conceitiſts; if they are neither wiſe, learned, or in any degree well qualified, they take upon them to be all, or at leaſt will be ſo in their own opinions; inſomuch that I have often admired and pittyed the confidence of ſuch, who with ſo much abſurdity endeavour to impoſe on the World: If a man ſhould undertake to underſtand the fifteen bodies of Euclide, and knew not what a Line or Superficies meant, or any of the Principles of

Geometry, he could not be more rediculous, then men of this humour are obſerved to be in their conceptions of things. It was a wiſe ſaying of *Ariſtotle* to an indiſcreet and ignorant perſon, that he wiſhed, he was what he thought himſelf to be, and that his Enemies were ſuch, as he was; ſince it is impoſſible to be more accompliſhed, then a zealous Opiniater conceives of himſelf: were it not for this Self-affection, and Pride, their could not be ſo much obſtinacy and ignorance in the the world, and if we take *Solomons* judgement, it is hard to be reformed, who tell us, there is more hopes of a Fool then of ſuch.

Of Ingratitude.

THe Antients had ſo great a reſentment of Ingratitude, that they cenſur'd it to be a ſummary of Evils, whence grew their uſual ſaying, *Si ingratum dixeris, omnia dixeris*: not beleiving there was enough charged on an Ingrateful perſon, in calling him only ſuch, except all other evil

evil Inclinations were annexed to his reproach: there is no vice or failing of man, doth unprinciple humanity like this, since such an one, lives most unworthy of his Soul, that hath not virtue enough to be obliged, or that denies the due merits of the Obliger; He that receives a benefit without a suitable acknowledgement, doth rather take then receive, for he Robs the Giver of his just reward, and is in that sence a Felon that gives the worst evidence against himself: there is no Creature so criminal in order to ingratitude, as Man, the Dog, Horse, or Ass, are are enough to instruct, and condemn him, since they are not without their gratitude to their Owners and Preservers: And yet as great a meanness as goes along with this Crime, tis observable not to be only incident to vile persons, or such as are of low and unworthy Spirits, but to the Proud and Ambitious, who not seldome pay their obligements in Scorns, or some unworthy neglects, as if they would be thought to be above being beholding, nevertheless 'tis

frequently to be obſerved, that none fall more low before the Idol of Honour, and Ambition, then haughty and aſpiring perſons; how ſupple are their Knees? how fawning can they poſture their Faces and Garbs? Nay what Turpitude will they not commit, to comply with their arrogant deſires? Inſomuch that there are as many proud Paraſites uſually in Courts, as there are Zanies and Jeſters, who hope by this means to riſe in the favour of Princes, though it be hard (notwithſtanding all the Obligations a Crown can beſtow) to make an arrogant perſon truly grateful, ſince he will be apt to judge himſelf above the moſt Tranſcendent recompence, which ſometimes cauſes great and generous Princes, to have an evil regard to the merits of ſuch which oblige their reſentments, as was ſeen in the Caſe of *Henry* the 4. of *France*, and the Martial *Byron*, who rendered his deſerts (though very great) rather like ſo many affronts to his Prince, then fit for his reward or gratitude it muſt be a due reciprocation in virtue, that can make the Obliger and the

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Obliged, worthy, since there may be an equal defect in both; he that bestowes a benefit, though never so great, doth in a manner but *Male detinere*, as *Seneca* speaks, if there be not a suitable mind which accompanies the Act, for the Action cannot be laudable, if the intention be not equally deserving, and thus an Obligation or Benefit, may be as ingratefully disposed, as received, though it be somewhat the greater Crime to be guilty of an unworthiness in giving: *Anacharsis* the Philosopher, Nephew to *Cadonides* King of *Scythia*, after his return, told the King his Uncle, that the *Grecians* were busied in all kinds of wisdome, but that the *Lacedimonians* above any, knew how to give and receive prudently; an Observaon worthy of so great Philosopher, since it contains in a manner a summary of the best Humanity and Ethicks, there being scarce any Action morally good, but hath a great affinity to so worthy a practice: and yet we shall find that men of the most eminent and conspicuous merits, have been made the most remarkable Ob-

jects of ingratitude, like the Sun when ſhining in greateſt luſtre, is often neer the interpoſition of a Cloud: ſuch hath been very generally the fate of publick Miniſters, and great Captains, ſome of whom, have in an extraordinary manner obliged the Prince or State, that hath imployed their Abilities, which when arrived to the Meridian of their glory, fall thence; to which purpoſe, there are many examples antient and modern: and it is not to be doubted, but that Monarchies and States have like kindneſs for ſuch deſerts in their Miniſters, as may be eſteemed above, or at leaſt not eaſily within the compaſs of their power to gratifie, it being not an over merit, but a convenient one, that ſuits beſt with the temper of States and Princes, who are apt to ſuſpect, that the moſt glorious Actions done by their Subſtitutes, are a derogation for their valour or prudence, or otherwiſe dangerous (eſpecially if receiving any great degree of popular Luſtre) in order to ambitious deſigns and ends. It was antiently the practice of ſome famous Republicks to make a publick in-

ingratitude, part of their Polliticks, thus in *Athens* they perſecuted many of their deſerving Citizens into Oſtraciſme, or Baniſhment: as likewiſe in *Rome*, notwithſtanding that Soul of greatneſs, which guided all their actions, they had not honour enough to be grateful, as was ſeen in the Caſe of *Camillus* (who is ſaid to be five times baniſhed) and *Scipio Africanus* and many others, the firſt of whom delivered his Country from the *Gaules*, the latter from the *Carthaginians*; which tells us, that this Commonwealth produced ſuch Heroick Spirits, as acted more for the honour of their Country, and love of Virtue, then for any expectation to receive a gratitude, ſuitable to the value of their merits; which kind of unworthineſs is more frequent under States, then Monarchies, by reaſon that Republicks have a greater apprehenſion of Popularity and Ambition in their Citizens, and conſequently are more obliged to check their eſteem: beſides the danger of being ingrateful, is not ſo great in a Commonwealth, as in a Monarchy, becauſe in a State, tis not

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ſo eaſie to fix the injury, it being the Act of many; generally where it hath been the Crime of Princes, it hath been in thoſe, who have made it their pollicy and reaſon of State (ſuitable to the practice of the *Othoman* Emperors at this day) or in ſuch who are noted for cruel and ſuſpitious Natures; as was obſerved in *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, and ſome others, of the *Roman* Emperors, who had ſuch a variety of evil in their Natures, that as *Tacitus* obſerves of *Nero*, that it was not ſafe under them to do ill (though moſt ſuitable to their Genius) nor alwayes to do well: On the contrary, how great were the Obligations, that *Julius* and *Auguſtus Cæſar*, conferred on deſerving Perſons, of all kinds, t'were endleſs to recount them, and yet they did not judge their own glory leſſened, in making eminent the deſerts of others, (becauſe they held that the Superiour Orbe of Virtue, belonged to themſelves) which is very often the jealouſie of mean Spirited Princes, and yet if we compare *Lewis* the 11*th.* of *France*, a puſillanimous King, with our *Henry*

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the *7th.* very near his contemporary, we ſhall find that the latter, though a prudent and a magnanimious Prince, was very much his paralell in being over cautious in rewarding, and no leſs jealous of ſuch as were too conſpicuous in point of merit, which was thought to produce that cruel ingratitude of his to the Lord *Stanly*, in taking away his Life, notwithſtanding his ſignal ſervice at *Bosworthfeild*, where he won the Crown, and other Obligations, this Prince had to him, which tells us, that the greateſt Perſonages have not alwaves the moſt faithful and worthy memories: *Ariſtotle* being asked what was ſooneſt forgotten amongſt men, replyed, a benefit; to which, mankind is generally ſo propence, as it they had drunk of the River of *Lethe*; or that amongſt men, there wanted ſo much Virtue, as to compleat the due acknowledgement of an Obligation: he that doth oblige in hope of a ſuitable return, is but an ill moraliſt and is likely to deceive himſelf; the World muſt be dealt with, as one would with a Niggard, who is more retentive of his

his *de voir's*; then inclined to be at the charge of paying them in order to a requital; which teacheth us to do cheifly for the love of good, it being no leſs divine, then a Heroick precept and practice.

Of Confidence and Boldneſs.

THere is an outward Trimming and Dreſs, that Suits more or leſs to the advantage of every mans diſpoſition and parts, and though confidence is no virtue, yet experience well obſerves, 'tis able to beggar one half of them; and is the beſt paint that ſome Complexions can put on, which paſs more regarded, and looked on in the World, ſo as the colours are laid on, but with reaſonable artifice: there are People but few Meridians diſtant from us, who can travail far in the world, on the account of Boldneſs, as if Nature had beſtowed this Gift on them, inſtead of other advantages: many perſons (though of deſerving capacities) had never been advanced to place and dignity,

nity, had not their confidence, made their firſt courtſhips of Fortune: *Audaces fortuna juvat*: nor is the World ſo in love with any mans merit, but it is willing enough to obſcure his deſerts, if it ſhall have his compliance; and we ſee in Courts, (notwithſtanding the moſt ſubmiſſive obſervances paid to the Throne) that bold and confident perſons, make generally their approaches more ſure to the favour of Princes, when perhaps the ſingle ſtrength of their virtues and merits, had met a repulſe; whether it be, that Princes love to be wonne, like own Fortune, by many attempts, and importunities, or that they more eaſily condeſcend to allow the merits of ſuch whoſe confidence doth in ſome part raiſe their value: as it is very ordinary to obſerve in men of this temper, who make it their buſineſs to ſet out, and gild themſelves; there is no greater cheate in the world, then the abuſes of Oſtentation; and though ſuch perſons have not ſo general credit, as to be received altogether on their words, experience doth often find, that they

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do ſo order the ſtories and accounts given of themſelves, that like to the reading of Romances, there are more taken with the tale and relation, then concern'd the truth. And on the other ſide, a due quantity of confidence, is not only requiſite, in order to the juſtification of virtue, but even abſolutely neceſſary for its Conduct, whilſt the world doth maintain ſuch a conſtant War betwixt Virtue and Vice, (and the latter being ſo much the more potent Enemy) the former had need be couragious to oppoſe its aſſaults, and batter that ſo formidable ſtrength of impudence, which vice is armed with; it being very obvious to obſerve, that boldneſs, as it is uſed by extravagant and vitious Perſons, is generally imployed to the aſſiſtance of ſome exorbitancy of paſſion, or other evil Inclination in their Natures, whilſt virtue doth moſt appear under the conduct of modeſty: inſomuch that in men indued with greateſt accompliſhments, we ſee the higheſt defiance of any Act, which may give their Souls a bluſh, in being over confident or preſuming on their

their worth and merit: So that this paſſion of boldneſs ſhould be placed on the left hand of Virtue, like a ſword there worn to be ready in its cauſe, and aſſiſtance, rather then any incident to its greatneſs. *Cato* the elder was uſed to ſay of modeſty, that it was *virtutis color*; judging the graces that accompany virtuous perſons to be more conſpicuous and beautified by it, an impudent face is more ſuitable to an Actor on the ſtage, who neither perſonates himſelf, or what poſſibly was ever true, then to repreſent a real character, there being nothing more vain, then for men to over-act themſelves. How ridiculous is it to diſcretion, to hear a man boaſt of his Valour, witt, learning, or any other accompliſhment as if he could be allowed to be his own Panagerick, and yet there are not a few, guilty of this affectation, who think their triumph can never be great enough, except to ſhew its Pompe, they raiſe a good part of the duſt themſelves.

There is another defect (and not the leaſt) in men of this complexion, which is, when meerly out of Pride and

and intereſt, they oppoſe and contemn the merits of ſuch, who are more deſerving, as is often ſeen on private and publick accounts, but moſt ſeverely when the management of Courts and favours of Princes are committed to arrogant and ignorant perſons, who are apprehenſive of men of greater abilities, then themſelves; to be ſhort, the world in the greateſt part of mankind diſcovers to us ſuch a Theater of boldneſs, or what is more degenerate (impudence) as it ſtands inclined to vice, that it were endleſs to ſumme all the Characters of it, the beſt commendation can be given of it, is, that though it is not laudable, tis not unuſeful, and what the uſual Proverb ſayes of honeſty, that who doth practiſe it too ſtrictly, is in ſome danger of dying a beggar, the contrary is often the caſe of confidence, inſomuch that whoſoever hath a good ſhare of the latter, doth ſeldome fayl of having the beſt advantages, the world and fortune can beſtow.

Of Opinion.

OPinion is the greateſt Dictator of the world, whoſe Lawes, (like thoſe of abſolute power) rather impoſe on the underſtandings of men, then win them to embrace a juſt obedience: it directs and guides us as it pleaſeth, we cannot keep the Road of true apprehenſion, but we behold our ſelves to ramble in ſeveral Paths, to follow the conduct of this imaginary Guide, which like an *ignis fatuus*, very often leaves us more in the dark, or at greater diſtance from the way and place, we ſhould arrive at: To diſtinguiſh it from reaſon, is very difficult, becauſe Opinion is ſo prevalent, as it will adjudge to its ſelf, the major part of our underſtanding, though it is but a notion of ſence, and comes not within any Sillogiſme of reaſon: if we ſtrictly examine the greateſt part of things, that redound to the content of Body or Mind, we ſhall find them more or leſs agreeable, as

they are received and valued by Opinion, what otherwiſe were Beauty, Honour, Riches and other accidental and circumſtantial things of Life, but as their eſteem is raiſed by it: as on the other ſide, very many of our Infelicities in either kind, would not be thought ours, did not the tiranny of Opinion, which is ever making the moſt ſevere Laws againſt our ſelves, adjudge them ſuch: To which purpoſe *Epicurus* wiſely demands, how it comes to paſs that no man is concern'd or greived either for the loſs of his name, Robbery of his Goods, the death of Wife and Children, or any dear Relation, until he knows it, if nature was obliged to feel any evil upon ſuch accidents and events, or did not ſuffer meerly under the notion and prejudice of Opinion, which produces thoſe reflections on our ſelves; whence he concludes that this Creature of imagination cauſes ſuch evils of Body and Mind, as would have otherwiſe no being without it. It would be endleſs to examine what effects it hath both moral and divine, ſince not only

ly our manners, but a very great part of the Religions of the world, would fall into the account, that have little beſides this prop to uphold them: How many are the Polemicks and diſputations, that make a noiſe in the Schooles, which have no greater authority, then the credit of a thought, inſomuch that *Ariſtotle* is as often baſled as approved; which ſhews us that reaſon fills but a ſmall Volume of the mind, in reſpect of Opinion, or elſe hath not Logick enough to confine our conceptions, who like Children of Ignorance are more delighted with the Toyes of the Brain, then the Sollidity of thought: We muſt cautiouſly proceed like Chymiſts where with our underſtandings, our endeavour ſhould be, to diſtinguiſh and ſeperate the real and noble part of our imaginations from the fumes and Ideas of Sence, which abuſe us with the groſsneſs of conjecture, whereby we render more uſeful and active the Spirits of knowledge, for though its true, that our greateſt Errors ariſe from the misguidance of thought, we are not therefore to diſcourage thinking,

or (what is worſe, then being deceived by our ſelves) take any thing upon truſt from others, which reaſon doth not credit, it being moſt certain, that ſober ruminatings and conceptions of the mind, have been the Productions of the moſt knowing and wiſeſt of mankind: great and perfect thoughts are the Ornaments of the underſtanding, but if vitiated and deformed by Opinion, they ſoon grow to be luxuriant and monſtrous, which like to the Enormous productions of Nature, we ſhould admire more for their ſtrangneſs, then beauty. To conclude, Opinion properly imployed, may be an aſſiſtance unto Reaſon, ſo as we keep her on the left hand of our thoughts, but if we reſign to her, the right, we ſhall ſoon prove her guilty of a vain and exorbitant power.

Of Converſe.

THe Entertainments of the mind ſhould reſemble thoſe of our Tables, they muſt have their ſeveral courſes, of which, ſome Meſſes ought to be ſolid, others like Sallats, and things of light digeſtion; to dwell long upon a Subject is not grateful, or diſcreet, the Brain being like a Feild, which (though never ſo rich) if you over harrow it, you ſhall be ſure to turn up barren ground at laſt; I have known ſome, that when they have got into a ſtory or diſcourſe, have not known where to make an end, as if they had been loſt in a Circle, until ſome one of the Auditors, hath given a check to their Careers, by deſiring a Period; to avoid ſuch a man one would almoſt leap from a Steple, or gallop down a Hill or Precipice: there is not ſo great a provocation to Sence, as to converſe with thoſe, who abuſe in this manner, the benefits of Time,

Reaſon, and good manners at once; there are others likewiſe who make out ill, what they mean, yet will begin well, ſhewing a fair proſpect of things at a diſtance, but immediately ſhut the Door or Window upon you, whoſe diſcourſes, methinks reſemble ſome Agues, that have a ſhort hot Fit, but a long and ſecure cold one; and this impertinency is above all to be avoided, becauſe it raiſes expectation, and depreſſes it again: there is another Genius obſervable, in men who though they do not offend in a long fruitleſs diſcourſe, are not leſs irkſome to the Hearer, ſuch are thoſe, who quible with a word, till they have left it threadbare, or give a reparty to what is ſpoken, in a *Clinch*, a man that hath any ſence or ingenuity, would aſſoon be delighted with the noiſe of the Hammer and Horſe-nail, and yet I have obſerved ſome Pretenders to wit, who have not been a little guilty of this Vanity: and as the Clincher is by no means to be allowed the Chair, where a man would entertain a pleaſant and ingenuous Society, ſo I would give my

Vote, to diſplace the Pedant before him, I mean ſuch a one, as makes it his buſineſs to wrangle about frivolous Criticiſmes in words, and calls a man at every turn to give account of his Grammer, which though it is a great part of the buſineſs of a Schooll, it is too pedantick and low for a generous Converſe, while he that is well grown in knowledge, may perhaps forget, or not ſo much reſpect the firſt rudiments of Letters, it being more grateful to the mind, to contemplate the ſtructures of Learning as they ſtand finiſhed and adorned, then to diſcuſs the low materials of their Foundations: but enough of theſe particulars. As for a general direction to our Converſe, there are but two Cautions, which are, that we make it proper and pleaſant', pleaſant I mean as to the occaſion; in order to which, as we muſt ſhun prolixity, ſo there ought to be no leſs Caution, that what we expreſs be not uneaſie and ſtiff with words, (which though moiſtned with the beſt conceit) can never delight the Hearer: the other is, that it be proper to the perſons; for example, a

man would not entertain a Lady with a discourse of Logick or the Mathematicks, or a Divine with hunting, a Souldier, with Law Cases and the like: to be home and smart in a Reply, quickens Conversation, and Mirth, so it savour not of a Mock, or Satyr, there being not any thing, which gives a greater Wound to the Soul, then words, so that where a man hath a Genius, that is too sharp, and pointed 'tis prudence to abate the edge: some there are, that bite not by way of reparty, but give you their salt in some Proverb or Tale, applied to the occasion, in which they will be home and bitter enough; though it is somewhat less offensive then the former, because it seems the sence of Authority and Time, and not to proceed from the deliverer. Above all things there must be truth in our conversation, or it cannot be useful or pleasant: a Lyar may be admired for his conceit or contrivance, as men love to entertain themselves with Novelties, but there is generally as little use to be made of the imaginations of his Brain, as there is for the

the idleſt Dreams, beſides, he is ſo much the diſadvantage of truth and himſelf, that he will hardly find credit enough to be beleived, if at any time he ſpeaks it.

Of Knowledge and Reading.

KNowledge is the moſt excellent endowment of the mind, but it muſt be enriched with ſome other Acquiſitions, beſides the Treaſures of our own Conceptions; who relies too much on himſelf, is in danger of having a Fool to his Maſter: There are but two wayes of knowing, either it conſiſts in Theory, or as it becomes practicable and demonſtrative: for the Theory of Knowledge, we muſt generally have a recourſe to Books, as Fountains of Science, ſince in moſt ages of the world, men have poured into them, the moſt conſiderable part of their thoughts; our Journeys towards Knowledge, are wiſely begun there, but we muſt take care, that we do not dwell, where we are but to travail and paſs, they are good Aſſiſtants and

and Guides, if not followed too far, or that we do not attempt by them, to climb over the craggy Rocks and Mountains of Science, which they undertake to discover, where such Fogs and Mists are not seldome met with, as cloud and amaze, rather then clear our understandings: we should therefore collect the best things out of them, or as the excellent Lord *Bacon* observes, but chew some, while we digest others, there being in Books, as we see in Feilds and Gardens, some parts Rubbage and Weeds, others that nourish Corn and Flowers. To make them too much our entertainment, or discourse, savours of common place, and Pedantisme: I have known some, that putting them from the Road of Authors, and Quotations, have had little to say, if you hear a good thing from them at one time, tis odds, but on the least occasion, you shall hear it again, which shews an unready Conception, or want of diligence in thought. To have some prospect in Logick, and Phylosophy, is good, because they assist and embelish reason; but as I would not take *Aristotles* word

word in all things, before *Ramus*, ſo I would prefer *Deſcartes* before either, where my judgement approved it: Tis a threadbare way of Science, to know no more, then hath been taught us; and we ought to remember, that as other men thought before they writ, ſo we ſhould uſe the like Freedome to inſtruct our ſelves, ſince Learning at firſt, could be no more, then the beſt way of thinking: Beſides, how many are there, who would be content to exchange their acquired parts by Study, for the natural quickneſs and Flowers of thought, which ſpring from others we can little advantage by reading of books, if we do not come to their peruſing with a genius equal to what we read, as he that finds a Diamond muſt be able to diſtinguiſh it from a pebble, ſo that in converſing with books, we are but made more acquainted with our ſelves by the aſſiſtance of others.

In demonſtrative Science, Authors have not been ſo intricate and voluminous, and therefore more directly to be embraced: the fifteen Books of

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Euclide, do well nigh put a Crown upon the work, we may read in them the firſt propoſition conſpiring with the laſt, as if the whole were but one demonſtration ; whence this kind of Learning, may juſtly claim the moſt Superlative eſteem, becauſe it conſiſts not in opinion, or controverſie, or taking ſomething for granted, but what it proves: he that does not make his Courtſhip to this Knowledge, doth neglect the Queen of Truth ; but I could wiſh the difficult and knotty queſtions of *Algebra*, were laid aſide, becauſe they are not only unabſolvable, but give to Arithmetick and Geometry, a needleſs intricacy, in which conſiſt the beauties of this Knowledge. Next to this of demonſtration, there is nothing more uſeful then Hiſtory, for it teacheth us the experience and practice of men ; tis a ſhort, but a full and noble commendation, that *Cicero* gives of it, when he calls it *Teſtis temporum, vitæ memoria*, for by it alone, we are allowed to compare men and times : there being nothing more uſeful either for publick or private perſons, then ſometimes to look back-

backward. There is another ſort of knowing, and not leſs uſeful, then any, which men learn without Book, and that is the experience and obſervation of one another, theſe are our living Books, while all the advantage we can gain by the other, is but to give us ſome polite furniture or varniſh, the better to ſet out the endowments of Nature: I knew a learned man, who would ſay, that every man brought three parts of his Knowledge into the world, and that the advantages of Study, was but a fourth, added to the other three; And if it ſhall be conſidered, how much farther men proceed in many imployments of their underſtanding, on the meer account of good naturals, in reſpect what Books do enable men to do, it will not be thought ſo great a barbariſme, as it is, to ſee men of Airy and ſubtile apprehenſions preſuming on their abilities, without taking pains to improve them by reading, to be ſhort, Books are like Phyſick, they may a little clear and refine ſome groſſeneſs of Nature, as on the other ſide, they cloy and nauſeate the

the underſtanding, if uſed as its food. A curſory Knowledge, though it be not exact enough for the Schools, is more pleaſant, and perhaps more uſeful then to over burthen the Brain with Books, which may be called a Gentleman-like Learning, or one who is in *Omnibus aliquid*, I mean ſo diſpoſed, that he knows how to make the beſt uſe of his acquired and natural parts together, which well joyned cannot but render an accompliſhed perſon.

Of Wit and Language.

WHat Wit is, ſeems as hard to define, as Truth, which moſt men pretend to, and as many diſpute, but few rightly determine: That this age hath its ignorance in point of ingenuity, aſwel as the antient, is to be acknowledged, ſince we cannot ſhew better Cards for it, perhaps then they could; it hath ever had a valew from the world; but as Gold that wants coynage will not paſs for money, ſo Wit hath in all times

times wanted such an authority, or stamp, as might give it a certain valew, amongst men: Every age hath generally a certain mode and manner of expression and wrighting, different, as we see tis now with us; if we compare the present and past times together, some have been, in which, Language hath been more majestick, or more rough, and of stronger sinues, then others, which have not so much affected height or strength, as to be easie and perspicuous in point of expression: Thus Ingenuity hath not only its ages of growth and glory but very often (instead of keeping the just proportions and vigour of manhood) falls back to dotage, or childhood again: I am not so in love with our own times and faces, as that I fancy in our selves a greater excellency, then in our predecessors; who can think that the famous St. *Phillip Sydney*, or the incomparable Lord *Bacon* have been out done in their several kinds, or *Shakespear*, *Beaumont*, and *Fletcher*, or *Ben Johnson* in theirs, by any of our present writers: Nor do I beleive it otherwise then a vulgar error to judge that

that the language we now ſpeak and write, is more refined, then what they uſed, becauſe we conceive it to be poliſhed and enlarged by introducing ſome few French words, not conſidering, how many of the old, (perhaps of better ſignification as to our ſpeech) are forgotten or wanted in their ſtead: I would willingly be reſolved, if *careſs*, *trepan*, *harange*, and the like, had been written by *Chaucer*, whether they had not appeared as harſh and barbarous to us now, as any of the moſt obſolet uſed by him; ſo that it is an affectation of the preſent times, which gives a valew to words, rather then their aptneſs or weight. And though the Treaſures of a Language conſiſt in words, it is not eaſie to know when our Speech is richeſt; the antient *Greek* and *Latine* preſerve the ſame eſteem they ever had (ſince known unto us) becauſe they have borrowed no words from the reſt of the world, ſo that their Speech and Eloquence maintains one conſtant repute, and glory, but with us, the Caſe is not the ſame, having introduced much of the Speech

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of other Nations, to our ſelves; therefore we cannot juſtly conclude when our Language is at the heigth or beſt, ſince every age with us will have the greateſt eſteem for the Speech they uſe. There are few Languages that have not expreſſions ſuitable enough to the conceptions of the Speaker, wherefore men are far more beholding to the ingenuity of thought, then to any advantage in words: ſuppoſe *Engliſh* is not held ſo accompliſhed a Speech as *French*, *Spaniſh* or *Italian*, what matter is it, if upon a juſt deciſion, neither our Pens nor Tongues expreſs below the ſtrength of theirs: moſt Languages have a manner of Phraſe and Elegancy, which will not become another, and therefore not eaſily compared, for example in Latine, tis ſaid by *Iulius Cæſar* in his Commentaries *Eos eſſe* P. R. *exercitus, qui cælum poſſint perrumpere*: and the like in many of the beſt Latine Authors, which were unpardonable in ours: ſo in the *French* to ſay, *Il n' eſtoit point bien dans ſon neant*, meant thereby that he was not humble enough, he was not well in his nothing;

would neither be a Phraſe, or ſence in ours. Now for wit the Ornament of words, it is to be conſidered as ſpoken or written (the laſt of which ſhall be treated of in a ſucceeding diſcourſe) as to the former, it ſweetens converſe, ſo it be delightful and proper: To have the reputation of a wit, as the denomination is generally taken amonſt us, ſignifies little to its repute, becauſe it is rather applied to Ralleries and Satyr, then pregnancy and beauty of conceit: a gracious and eloquent perſon, will uſe Wit as a defence, rather then a Weapon, and yet I knew a Lady, who had no ſmall value for her attraction and ingenuity, that was ſo unfortunate to be cenſured ſo highly, for one bitter expreſſion, that much of her former Grace was impaired, in the opinion of her juſt admirers; which ſhews us that Wit is ſeldome ſo qualified, as it doth not taſte ſometime or other, of ill Nature: as there are too many, that will loſe their Freind, rather then their Jeſt, Wit being generally ſuch an extravagancy of the Brain that who is wiſe, will

will be ſure to keep it in due limits and correct it by his judgement.

Of Writing.

HE that Writes in hope to have the reputation of an Author, is like ſeeking of preferment, that is already poſſeſſ'd, ſince there are ſo many that claim a preheminence in all manner of Wit and Learning before him, that he may conclude of his repute, and judge of his endeavour, not worth the fouling of his Pen; beſides men are not ſo eaſily inclined to be inſtructed in order to their improvement in knowledge, the moſt being apt to conceive they are wiſe enough for themſelves and the World, without farther aſſiſtance: it being as impoſſible that one mans Pen ſhould give ſatisfaction to the World, as that his Sword alone, ſhould be able to Conquer it; men will have their opinions, and Writers muſt be content to enjoy their own, they may offer their judgements for the publick good, but muſt not hope to impoſe it by the power

of their Pen, remembring that the world doth as often pronounce an Arbritary ſentence, as an equitable or wiſe one: I have often wondred to obſerve, how eaſily ſome would pardon what was ſpoken, and yet ſeverely cenſure what was written, as if it were needful in one kind, and not in the other, or that it were poſſible the deliberation of thought (though never ſo great) could be without miſtake or error: he that publiſhes what he writes, hath as much need of fortune as merit, let his work be never ſo deſerving; No leſs have I admired how eaſily the world hath been pleaſed with ſome things (though inconſiderable) and how mean the reception hath been of others, though of far greater value; for a Compariſon, how many Authors of credit have the Tales of *Tom Thumb*, *Amadis de Gaul*, *Bevis* of *Southampton*, and the like ſurvived, whilſt the works of moſt of the antient Philoſophers, and not a few of the *Roman* Eloquence and Glory, we read in fragments or elſe neglected and forgotten, or buried and devour-

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ed by Moths and Cobwebs; which ſhews that the beſt things are leſs beholding to Fortune, then the worſt: he that hopes to live long by his Pen, may perhaps write the Epitaph of his Learning or Wit, and give the world occaſion to do it for him; yet notwithſtanding theſe diſcouragements, we muſt not deſiſt from publiſhing what we conceive beneficial to be communicated, he that doth ſo, is like one that dies rich, but doth as much as in him lyes to make no body ſo after him, which were neither juſt nor charitable, ſince it looks as if they envyed the world the Talents of their knowledge; and yet this moroſeneſs of humour hath been common enough in many of great abilities: others there are, who are ſo prodigal of their Pens, as they conceive not a thought they eſteem, but is committed to writing, as if they were in ſome fear the world, or themſelves would be great Looſers ſhould their Wit not be recorded, or publiſhed; but as this ſavours of Vainglory, ſo on the other ſide, he is not a prudent manager of his knowledge,

who doth not commit it to some memorial (it is what I reprehend in my self, that I have so little to shew of what I have observed or read, not having a Line in a Note-book taken out of any Author) our Age had otherwise been not so much beholding to the former, and why should not succeeding times look to be as much obliged unto us; how had we understood the Wit and Glory of *Rome*, but by Authors, and it was no small part of its felicity and greatness to have both described by so famous Historians as *Titus Livius* and the rest; on the other side, there hath been no Empire or State, that hath been so truly and advantagiously represented to the world, as such, which have produced Pens able to describe their ingenuity and glory: as tis observeable in the *Turks*, who though beholding to *Mars* for a mighty Empire, have been less obliged to *Mercury*, especially in not having produced one native Writer, who hath set forth the original and progress of their monarchy and greatness, so that they are at this day beholding to the rest of the

world

world for an account of themſelves, which though perhaps leſs partial, cannot be ſuppoſed to be more true, then if it had been delivered by Pens of their own. Certainly of all morral learning, Hiſtory is moſt uſeful, for it is the knowledge of men, times and buſineſs; Mathematicks may furniſh us with demonſtration, Poetry with the Wit of Ages paſt, or give us ſome light of their manners, ſo it be Satyr; but nothing can make us ſo morally knowing (and conſequently ſo much to be eſteemed, as the former, becauſe it brings us back as it were to live with former men and times, giving us the advantage of theirs and our own together; Obſervations by way of Politicks are likewiſe very uſeful, if they are grounded on Hiſtory that is Authentick, and of beſt eſteem, as we ſee in the excellent diſcourſes of *Machiavel* on ſome of the Decads of *Livy*.

Next to the writing of good matter, a gratious and eloquent Stile is to be endeavoured, it being the Glaſs, in which is to be diſcerned the Writers

thoughts ; he that Pens obſcurely, is hardly worth the ſtudy of his Reader, who perhaps may want a Dictionary for his words : ſome have thought to honour Antiquity by uſing ſuch as were obſolete, as hath been done by our famous *Spencer*, and others, though the times paſt are no more reſpected by an unneceſſary continuing of their words then if wee wore conſtantly the ſame trimming to our Cloaths as they did, for it is not Speech, but things which render antiquity venerable, beſides the danger of expreſſing no Language, if as *Spencer* made uſe of *Chaucers*, we ſhould likewiſe introduce his ; it was excellently obſerved by our great *Ben. Johnſon*, that the eldeſt of the preſent, and the neweſt of the paſt Language is the beſt, which gives enough of our reſpect to antiquity, in point of Speech : and yet I judge it a far leſs Error, where I check at the reading of a word, then where the ſence is ſo difficult or obſcure, that the meaning may be diſputed, though ſome have thought, they are never deep enough, except they drown the apprehenſion of the

Reader

Reader: whereſoever the ſence is granted, the word ought to have a favourable conſtruction, ſince it is more judicious to argue the reaſon of an expreſſion, then the validity of its delivery: an Author whoſe ſence is narrow and mean, though he be never ſo great a maſter of Language deſerves the loweſt contempt; There are ſome who have raiſed Books to great Bulks, by filling them with a vain ſound of Eloquence, when their matter hath not been conſiderable enough for a Sheet of Paper. In ſhort, Writing ſhould reſemble our habits, not unfaſhionable, moroſe or uneaſie, but for our uſe proper and pleaſant, as on the other ſide, when apparel'd too fantaſtically and light, it ſhews but the Feathers of words, which are blown away by the ſmalleſt breath of an obſervant and Judicious Reader.

Of Poetry.

POetry, Muſick and Painting have had a general reception, though of inconſiderable uſe and benefit, either as to publick or private affairs, becauſe men will alwayes have an indulgence to things of Ornament and Pleaſure, inſomuch as it is generally objected as a particular Character of ill nature in ſuch, who have not been delighted with them.

Painting requires a Harmony in proportion, as Muſick the excellency of Sounds, but Poetry muſt have all theſe in the life and ſweetneſs of Words, which gives it a prerogative and eſteem above them : ſome have been ſo indulgent to the Muſes, as they have honoured Poetry with the name of Science, but hardly juſtifiable, notwithſtanding the higheſt attributes can be given it : it being ſo inconſiderably principled, that all the Rules it can pretend to, amount to little more then the quantities of Syllables,

Syllables, and Numbers in Verſe; while its Conceptions and manner of their delivery, is without Limitation or Rules, and therefore not to be taught by a Lawrell'd Doctor. It gleans much from Sciences, but gives them nothing of their own the ſame way; As Chymiſts extract from Minerals and other things, to make their virtues more refined; to Poetry, this conſideration could not but give it a great part of that reverence and eſteem which the wiſeſt of the antients have thought fit to allow it, (as they did to *Linus*, *Orpheus*, *Muſeus*, and the like) in whom they joyned the dignities of the Muſes and Preiſthood together, converting the devineſt of their Wit and Imaginations into Religion, and its next beſt guide morallity, conceiving they could not do better then to contemplate (though by Fixion) what they could not otherwiſe beautifie and admire; & ſhews us, that when the Conceptions of men in former Ages, were moſt groſs, and barbarous, they were then beholding to the Muſes for a great part of their Piety and Morallities of life,

life, which coming into the thoughts of men, before the world was acquainted with the Schools or Learnling (as is concluded by the moſt knowing in antiquity, ſince Poets were long precedent to Phyloſophers and Arts) could not but give good advantage to Science, when it after came to be eſtabliſhed, whilſt men had been ſo prepared and enlightned by the moſt refined Conceptions of thought; which antiently gave to it ſome excellence, above what it can now challeng, not only falling lower in Spirit, but further degenerating, by entitling to the Muſes the Ribaldry and Scurrilities of mens Conceptions, too much practiſed in our times; as if the Muſes might now lawfully be diveſted of the Ornaments and Embroideries of imagination, they had ſo long wore as their glory: it is ſome wonder that the ingenuous and worthy ſhould ſubmit to implore them on ſo mean and diſhonourable accounts; tis true, ſuch may put the Muſes a little out of countenance, but it lyeth not in their power to abrogate totally their worth. I do not find any

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thing more to be admired, then the long esteem and practice of Poetry, not only as it is of small necessity, but as there is so little ever writ, which hath been allowed to be good (as an incouragement to others) by such as undertake to censure: Poets may delight themselves with their raptures, but are like to please the world less then all other Writers, there being nothing so much disputed, as that kind of Wit, and perhaps doth more admit it, because it consists in little more, then a Criticisme of words; Besides these discouragements, Poets are seldome received into the good opinion of sober and discreet persons, because their ingenuities are judged to be too extravagant and airy for prudence to fix with; as we see Ships, that are more to be valued for their Trimming and Sails, then for their burthen, and freight, which cannot but give its Professors some disrepute, as to private and publick affairs: yet if duely considered, Poets may put in their claims with others, if not admitted to some preheminence above them, because such as are able to beau-

beautifie and exalt Nature by fixion, cannot be ignorant of the ſollidity of truth, as in very many of them we find, things of no ſmall importance, in reference to policy, and humane Society, or whatſoever is inſtructive unto the excellency of manners. This conſideration induced *Auguſtus Cæſar* to favour *Virgil* & *Horace*, not only as moſt renowned in Poetry, but as having otherwiſe abilities fit to ſerve the affairs of ſo great an Emperour.

As to the genius of Poetry in general (ſince we ſhall not here diſcourſe of all its perticular kinds) it doth no way appear ſo acceptable, as when things are delivered in imitation of nature, yet ſo, as they are remote, and natural together, like what we ſpeak and yet above it in ſpirit, whence firſt it received a repute amongſt the Ancients, and gave Poets divine Honours, as was done to *Orpheus*, and others: therefore proverbial, and common-place wit, is not to hope protection from the Muſes, becauſe it depreſſes their greatneſs, and Majeſty, which conſiſt in a diſtant ſimilitude of ſpeech, rather then

then what is mean and common: A Diamond is but a ſtone though never ſo much poliſhed, yet not ſo cheap, and eaſily found as a flint, or peble: Whence it is, that ſuch as are called Criticks, will ever have ſome quarrel to Poeſie, becauſe there was never any writ ſo plainly intelligible, or in many things ſence, if not a little allowed the benefit of *Metaphor*, and *Hyperbole*, there being no ſmall difficulty to expreſs any remoteneſs of thought, ſo, that it ſhall ſquare with a low community of Reaſon, and Words, which if rightly conſidered, would reconcile a great part of unneceſſary, and frivolous Criticiſmes. I remember *Virgil* hath this expreſſion in his third Book of his *Georgickes*, *Furit mugitibus æther*; which ſeverely examined, is not intelligible, or poſſible; his meaning was to expreſs (by a far fetch't *Hyperbole*) what had been too meanly expreſſed in a ſtrict ſignification; as if he had only ſaid, the Bull lows, which he there ſpeaks if it had ſignified no more, then what is vulgarly known; but in ſaying, that the Skye did thus, or at leaſt ſeem-

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ed to do that, which the others did, advances the force of the cauſe, by ſuppoſition of a more extraordinary effect: and thus in many Caſes, the truth of things receive no ſmall embelliſhments and glory, though delivered with the fixion, and hyperbole of Poets. But enough of theſe trifles, which I beleive there are not many of my Readers, will judge worth controverting.

As for Poetry in general (if I might adviſe) I would not Councel any (though never ſo ingenuous) to beſtow more of their contemplation on the Muſes, then what tends to diverſion of time, and recreation, ſince tis odds, they prove ſuch froward Miſtreſſes who (though ſerved with never ſo great devotion,) will give him, many peeviſh neglects, that he may well repent his courtſhip, or judge them not worth the trouble of admiring.

Of Love and Iealouſie.

LOve hath ſo much the command of our paſſion, that it plays the Tirant with us, as it pleaſeth, having too much of heat and fevour to be kept within the limits of a due temper, every Lover hath ſomething of the Romance in him, for he will be ſure to value the object of his affection, by ſome extravagance or other; there is not a word or look but muſt be judged above its value, ſo that of all perſons, Lovers may be concluded moſt impertinently vain glorious: there are no inſtructions prevalent enough to Tutor Nature, or give Love ſuch a *decorum*, as becomes men and morallity; we ſimpathize ſo much with the Creatures we command, that we practice it as imperfectly as they, and therefore it is well expreſſed by *Virgil* by an univerſallitie,

Omne adeo genus in Terris hominumq;
(ferarumq;
Et genus æquoreum, pecudes, pictæq;
(volucres,
In furias ignemq; ruunt : amor om-
(nibus idem.

For as Love is the glory and delight of Nature, ſo it is the deformity of it; there is nothing in which men are more rediculous and exorbitant, or go more backward with manhood, then when this affection too powerfully ſwayes; which of all other admits the greateſt mixture and prevalency of the Sences: the beſt attribute and good fortune of this paſſion is, to have a Title more quaint and delicate, then what the Act doth expreſs or deſerve, which would otherwiſe have likewiſe a courſe name: as it falls under the notion of Freindſhip, it is great, but as it tends to ſomething more in the enjoyments and delights of Concupiſcence, much leſs; ſince that part of it, which conſiſts in fruition, is not only exerciſed by the moſt barbarous of men, but the moſt in-

inconſiderable of Creatures; and therefore impoſſible the virtues of love, ſhould be ſo common as its vices:

One would wonder conſidering ſome excellencies in this paſſion, that it ſhould be as eaſily alaid, as our common Appetites of drouth, hunger and the like, inſomuch that Fruition of the object (inſtead of nouriſhing the deſire) produces Saciety, as is too often manifeſt, and not ſeldome the Diſeaſe of Wedlock.

Of all the Diſtempers of Love, there is not any more inconvenient and vexatious then Jealouſie, and indeed its greateſt Imbicillity; for then tis rather a Diſeaſe & Weakneſs, then of a temperature manly and becomming a worthy affection: ſome are naturally ſuſpitious, and conſequently will be Jealous, though it be far from being any propriety of Love, ſince to diſtruſt, and at the ſame time to be ſuppoſed to affect, is hard to underſtand; beſides in the moſt favourable underſtanding, the beſt attribute that can be given it, is, to call it Love too much awake.

There are few of this Complexion,

but think Love hath ſo many avenues and wayes of making his aproaches, as they judge they can never have ſecurity enough, where they miſtruſt; for ſuch will conceive this paſſion to be the moſt egregious Theif of all others, and can paſs down a Chimney, while the other doth uſually break through Doors and Windows; to which purpoſe, I knew a Gentleman (though otherwiſe Uxurious enough) who would occaſionally diſcourſe, that men of this temper, will have their diſſatisfactions and Phrenſies, though they judge it no other then a prudent and favourable concern for themſelves and Wives: And yet there is ſo much to be ſaid to the prejudice of this paſſion in general that none are more jealous, then ſuch who have had their failings in the ſame kind.

I never thought Jealouſie had ſo much of Nature in it, or that any Creature had been ſo unhappy as man, in being ſubject to this paſſion, and the inconveniencies attending it, till I read the ſtory of a Shepperd (if true) who being in love with a ſhee Goat, had his Brains beaten out by her

her Buck: As it is no discommendation to virtue, to have been assaulted, when it gives the repulse, so on the other side, there are few who are so gentle, and unconcern'd in their affections, as not to resent the circumstance conducing to the attempt; for though virtue is a strong hold, it is not alwayes impregnable, wee see the continued force of a long Seidge, hath at last won the strongest Fortresses and Cities.

Mountain in his Essayes, makes a question, whether the Exploits and Atcheivements of *Alexander* the great, or *Iulius Cesar*, exceed the virtuous resolution of a beautious young woman, exposed to the restless Sollicitations and Courtship of men, and I think it is no small glory to that Sex, in being so often Conqueresses: 'tis a great providence to such men who are conjugally united, when they are not unnecessarily inquisitive into the secrets of the Bed, since if the greater part of men were so inclined, the World would be much unh ppier then it is, there being few, who would not either find cause, or

take occaſion to be Jealous; and doubtleſs it is no ſmall difficulty ſo to continue and poiſe the affections of both Sexes, that they ſhall not incline to a defect or exceſs of paſſion, for what is there more rarely found, then ſuch Characters of Love and marriage, as have virtue and ingenuity enough to hold up their parts, until they conclude.

Though the excellency and perfection of Love, conſiſt in Union, we ſhall find it to be more Ethical, then Natural, ſince our Souls have too much Tincture of our Senses, to make it practicable. *Et mentem dedit ipſa venus.* What then are the difficulties that virtue muſt incounter, when it is required to be ſo ſpiritual not only in withſtanding all the allurements of Vice, but even the great and more reſiſtleſs power of Nature muſt be deveſted and ſubdued by it. To conclude, there are many men ſuſpect more then they need, as there are others leſs apprehenſive, or judge it prudence to ſeem unconcerned, leaſt they ſhould acknowledge the diſhonour, or be before hand with the world,

world, in calling themſelves Cuckolds, rather chuſing to be ſo wiſe, as not to ſeem to beleive what perhaps they really know or poſſibly cannot help; for my part, (if it were my Caſe) I would rather embrace the judgement of the latter, then be over wiſe or impertinently cautious with the former.

Of Courts and Princes.

AS Courts have much to do with the world, ſo they have no ſmall concern within themſelves, in order to the management of their affairs, which as they are of the greateſt magnitude, ſo there is required perſons of no leſs accompliſhments, to diſcharge the duties of their Princes and themſelves: this hath been alwayes the vain expectation of ſuch as are governed, becauſe they know not where otherwiſe to lay the blame of miſcarriages, as if they did require that Princes and their Miniſters, ſhould be more then humane; in foreſeeing and providing againſt all

inconveniencies, times or men can produce: I do not find (notwithstanding all the subtle instructions which *Machavel* and the rest have given to Princes) that they need not be beholding to times and fortune for some part of their felicities: Tis true the Characters of Princes ought to be advanced in point of esteem, because the reputation of their persons give honour to their governments, but they will hardly be held so sacred in their Texts, as to admit of no *Apocrypha*, for we find that mixture in the most holy and perfect of thoughts, and therefore must be incident to men howsoever dignified. I have wondered why some of our unfortunate Princes have been thought less wise, then others, who have been favour'd with all the advantages their own merits and fortune could compleat; since perhaps it hath been more great and magnanimous in some (though ruined by the attempt) to oppose the forwardness of their fates, by hazarding their peril and adversity, then it hath been the glory of others to pursue the gentle yeildings of fortune:

tune: *Hannibal* and *Pompey* though overcome, have not an inferiour repute to *Scipio* and *Cæsar* though Conquered by them: who can beleive our *Henry* the 2*d.* and *Richard* the 2*d.* or our late King *Charles*, less prudent and valiant (though more unfortunate) then many of our Kings, the latter of whom purchased immortal Honour, not only as he was forcibly deprived of his Soveraignty, but in his captivity, and more ignominious manner of death: How many Princes with their greatest Actions shall be forgotten, in the Comparison of the ever living glory of his name and sufferings, nay which of them all upon a due consideration would not obliterate the Fame of their renown and conquests, to have been the only Soveraign of such a Pen and Book, that will for ever record him the most excellent of Men, and Princes, it being a far less magnanimity in *Cæsar* to write his conquests, then it was in this King to enable his Pen by his afflictions. Nor is it avoidable in the condition of Princes to be more securely wise

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in point of ſafety, then the times they have to deal with, will admi, the ableſt of Pilots, may be drown'd in a Storm: there is no government can be ſo well defended, but the Torrent of popular rage may ſome time or other oreflow, and deface it; but theſe are inconveniencies that ſtand more on the right hand of Princes, or without their circles; it ſeldome happening that Princes are ſo weak or unfortunate as to ſuffer a deprivation of their Majeſty, or that Subjects appear ſo malicious and indiſcreet as to endeavour the ſubverſion of the State, and ruine of their King, as I beleive the example of our late times, was not more unfortunate, then ſingular in that kind: But there are others more contiguous to their perſons, and within their Doors, ſuch as are factious in their Courts and Counſels, and theſe not only have been, but ever will be, where there are Princes, to whom their advantages and glories give no ſmall invitation; Flies are never more buſie, then where the Sun ſhines warmeſt; though the fa-

favours of Princes are diffusive and many, they seldome are so numerous to fulfill the desires of all dependances, from whence arise Emulations and consequently factions.

In point of Counsel it signifies no great damage to the Throne, because a compliance in judgement, would not in many Cases discover, what an opposite discussion might manifest; Besides a Prince would lose the advantage of selecting what is most useful to inform him, from their several opinions, and where best to fix his own. There is nothing more requisite to a Prince, then to be able to give a right judgement of his Ministers, for in that Case he will go neer to be beforehand with their Counsels, *Machavel* gives this general rule, that if the Counsel of the Minister be at any time mixed, with what conduces more to his private advantage then to the publick in his Prince, he is to be held suspected, and dangerous; an Apothegme not unworthy the observation of Kings. There are other attempts in Ministers of a more

more inveterate and dangerous consequence which are when they seem to Act for the State, but really design against it, in order to their advantage and interest, by some intended alteration, which mischevous ingratitude was too deploreable in the Counsels of our late excellent King, the effects of whose prudence was undermined by the weakness and dishonesties of others, which gave him soon after the deserved reputation of being wisest, when alone. I have often admir'd to observe with what an extraordinary Eye, men have beheld the Counsels and Actions of Princes as if they had expected an infallability in either, or that the Title of sacred took from them the Errors of men, when if duly weighed, their affairs have very often as ordinary a conduct, as those of their Subjects; and why should it be otherwise expected (or not worse) since they have not only to deal with men, but more then ordinary difficulties to imploy their abilities: our private families though consisting of a few servants, will have their little intregues, fa-

factions and diſhoneſties: how then is it to be looked for, that the Courts of Kings, which have ſo many prevalent temptations both of Riches and Honour, ſhould be free from theſe inconveniencies there being nothing more difficult then to continue a true State of health in Courts, (ſo great a part of the body Politick) where men ſurfet on the exceſſes of eaſe and favour, or conceive themſelves injured in point of neglect.

But above all diſtempers incident to Soveraign power, there is none more prejudicial, then when a Prince is compelled or conceives it neceſſary to gratifie factions of oppoſite principles to his government (as in or near our times there are not a few examples) for then he doth as it were truck under them, and gives occaſion to Factions to aſpire, who will be ſure to give him enough of their diſturbance, ſo it be hopeful to conclude with their greater advantage, and intereſt in himſelf, beſides it diſobliges ſuch as are truly loyal, when they perceive it ſignifies little, or that they are capable of

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no advantages above the diſaffected, in being ſo; This is ſuch a midle way, as *Tacitus* judiciouſly calls that, which (*Nec amicos parat, nec inimicos tollit*) neither begets Freinds, nor ſecures Enemies: but whether it be a principle ſuitable to juſtice and honeſty, or only to be uſed as an expedient proper to ſome times, Princes are beſt able to judge: but let things go as they pleaſe, every honeſt and ſober man ſhall have occaſion enough to be obliged, where he is a ſubject, who will find it is no ſmall felicity, not only to enjoy what he doth, but that he is not made worſe: to which purpoſe I cannot pick ſo many ill men out of the Catalogue of Kings, as before I read Hiſtory, I had reaſon to expect, notwithſtanding the temptations of power by Ambition, Luxury, Avarice, and the like, on the otherſide I obſerved all theſe to be more frequently the enormities and frailties of common perſons which made me not a little thank providence for the choice of ſuch appointed over us.

Of Miracles.

HE that denies a Miraculous power, hath the wonders of Nature, and Providence, withall the Supernatural proceedings of both, to confute, which are actually and in themſelves ſo many Miracles: Take the whole circumference of the world, there is nothing to be found, that comes within the circle of Reaſon; there is not a Line to be drawn from that Center, to any part circumſcribed by the other, ſo much extraordinary, and above it: a man ſhall aſſoon find a propoſition in *Euclide*, for the being of the world (becauſe perhaps its form is circular) as to prove its production or continuation from any Act or demonſtration of Reaſon: if the effect is Miraculous, we may well conclude the cauſe to be ſuch, without farther trouble of Logick; I thank Heaven that I cannot look upward, without a due aſtoniſhment, and that

that I am obliged to providence for being my Tutor, without taking its Doctrine on the ſecond hand, though from any Society of men that conclude themſelves the devineſt of Teachers : there is ſo much wonder annexed to each mans individual being that every one is a Miracle to himſelf; not one of us is able to give an account how we or any other Creature came into the World, whether from individuals created at firſt (as the Scripture hath it) or from multitude of Anceſtors diſcharged by the Bowels of Nature, whence the Earth came to be peopled with men and repleniſhed with other inferiour Animals, though their univerſal Creation is more reaſonable to ſuppoſe, becauſe we do not ſee any like examples in Nature, which rather continues then produces the beginnings of things ; not only our ſelves, but all other things that have a ſubſiſtence in the World, are Miracles, I ſee nothing in Herbs Trees or Plants, that I do not as much admire in point of providence, as I do at what I behold in the Stars, nor do I judge it leſs

leſs wonderful, that the firſt are produced ſo familiarly for our own uſes, then that others ſhould continue in that number and order, in which have been ſo long obſerved, it being no leſs a providence, that we have them with the Spring and Summer, then to behold the glory of the others (without alteration) ſo many Periods of time; but theſe are the worlds every-dayes-ſupernaturals, there are others which have ſtrong parties for them, and no leſs then the ſeveral Religions of the world to vouch for them, and yet no viſible Teſtimony from providence and the works of Nature (and therefore far more queſtionable) it muſt needs provoke the ſmile of a judicious man to obſerve with what confidence the world is impoſed on by the Fanatick beleifs of men; We Chriſtians have not a greater Catalogue of Miraculous Teſtimonials of Faith, to confirm us, then are found in the *Iewiſh* Talmude, the *Alcoran* of *Mahomet* and the like: the reputation of doing Miracles, hath ever been the decay of moſt Religions; ſome will allow none *contra naturam*,

turam, but *præter naturam*, though I judge the distinction lame and imperfect, for what is besides the course of Nature, must be against it; whatsoever is a Miracle must put some absurdity on Nature; I cannot but allow it as miraculous to make two individuals in all things, the same in four, as the Creation of the World from nothing, because it alters the capacity of Nature, though so much of the matter were preexistent, besides it doth contradict and oppose the general order of Providence, (which is the far greater miracle) by introducing of a less in some one particular, and is the main question in point of possibility; wherefore I cannot sufficiently admire the miracle of the Loves and Fishes, by which our Saviour entertained so great a multitude, but whether by enlarging of their substances, or effected by a new Creation of Parts, I hold it temerity to determine; the like may be said of converting Water into Wine, the restoring of life to *Lazarus*: all which to reason are equally miraculous, because the alteration of that Element was as great

a miracle as the giving of Life, after its privation by the Act of death. Christians are obliged to beleive these, because they have the Authority of Faith for their warrant, but should therefore check themselves in being too credulous of others: how many impostures are allowed for Miracles, by ignorance or mistake of the proceedings in Nature? do we not attribute to Charms, to Witchcrafts a supernatural power? I would fain know, if the bereaving one of his sight, by any kind of facination, be not as much a Miracle, as the restoring of it by any means or power: there is a natural Magick which consists in the secret Operations of causes, though appearing no less then miraculous to us, because we are not able to apprehend them: I have known one whose Eyes have been immediately sore, by beholding of anothers, which were so, and if the Eyes can thus prejudice one another, why may not likewise the rest of the Sences have occultly either good or bad effects upon each other, as was attributed lately to a person call'd the Stroaker here in

London: but I find that Folly, Malice, or Revenge, are a good part of the proofs of Witchcraft, the world being apt enough to beleive worse of one another, then perhaps lies in their power to be.

I cannot but wonder that so learned a man as *Plutarch*, should attribute the Cessation of the Oracle of *Delphos*, to the accidental alteration of the Air and Vapours, in the place where the Oracle was delivered by the Preistess, and yet allow it to have been devine and miraculous, as if a supernatural effect could depend upon a natural Cause, a rediculous Conception, in so great a Phylosopher: I remember *Lucian* scoffingly makes a question, why the Gods were said to have so many Children in former times, and none in his days, the like may be in some sort said of Miracles, which have ever a greater repute from the Past then present Age: so for ought *Plutarch* knew, thi Oracle never was, other then an impostur, which ceased before his time. Some there are, who will grant but one Miracle, which is the World

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and its being, by which large demonſtration of a ſupernatural cauſe, they deny all other as neither neceſſary, or poſſible, for ſay they, if there be required a demonſtration of a devine power or providence, it is manifeſtly given in the order and being of the univerſe, if there be demanded any in order to any particular propoſition of Religion, they will look to find it in that mighty volume, or conclude it to be defective; whence it may be asked by way of *Quere*, how mankind came to be more forward in the atteſtation and reception of Miracles in all kinds, then was neceſſary for any Religion to acknowledge, becauſe it cannot be denied but the greateſt are paſſed already, in the being and the order of the univerſe, ſo that whether the hand of Providence hath obliged it ſelf by this great Maſter-peice of the World, to Act farther or no; we have ſufficient aſſurance that all ſubſequent Miracles, are not only granted by the greateſt Zealots of their beleif, to be very often ſuppoſititious and falſe, or ſeldome pretended to have really

been, but much inferiour in point of Evidence to the former, whenſoever they were ſuppoſ'd: I could have been well content (if Providence had thought fit) that my reaſon had been able to have gone along with my Faith, and that I might not in any thing contradict my being a man, in compliance to my Creed, but I do not find it the good pleaſure of Heaven, that it ſhould be ſo, I am therefore obliged to expel reaſon from having to do with my beleif; I find I have Faith and Humility enough to aſſent to many more Miracles, then are within the Fundamental Catalogue of our Religion, though I could wiſh I had not been neceſſitated to pin ſo many on my Creed, without being a Witneſs to one, in order to my own conviction; As St. *Auguſtine* made it his wiſh, to have been contemporary with the glory of *Rome*, ſo I could have been willing to have lived in the primitive time of Chriſtianity that I might have been inſtructed from its firſt ſupernatural Evidences: but Religion in this Caſe,

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is like antient Cuſtomes, for which men do not (after long uſage) give a reaſon of their reverence and eſteem, becauſe it is ſuppoſed acknowledged, by the introducing of the uſage; ſo the continued reception of our beleif forbids our farther curioſity: to be plain, he that doth not in this Age beleive without a Miracle, muſt have but a weak Faith, ſince it will be hard for him to find one to confirm him.

Of Spirits and Phantaſmes.

A Diſcreet man would aſſoon build his beleif on the Fictions of the Poets, the *Alcoran* of *Mahomet*, as to ſubmit his credence to Enthuſiaſmes of Spirits, ſince if rightly conſidered, men take upon them to grant that which they have no poſſibility to know; one may aſſoon comprehend all the obſcure

things in Nature, as what is the manner of exiſtency of Spirits, for want of which, the Schoolls have been forced to Coyn a Definition for them, in tearming them *Subſtantiæ incorporeæ*, but without being able to comprehend what an incorporeal ſubſtance is, not conſidering, that there is no ſmall contradiction in defining them to be ſubſtances, and yet without Bodies; tis as poſſible to have a notion of a vacuity, as to conceive the exiſtence of any thing without body: if the World had any ſuch thing in being, 'twere poſſible to make ſome reconcilement with Nature in the ſuppoſition, but we find nothing in her works, that can be called incorporeal; Our Saviours definition of a Spirit, doth rather ſilence then authoriſe the Schoolls in theirs: he only reſolves his Apoſtles negatively, that a Spirit had not Fleſh and Bones, as he had, but gives no authority to go farther, or affirms they were not corporeal, though he well knew, that the *Iews* had their Sadduces, who denied the being of Angels or Spirits.

That

That Spirits have a proper exiſtence, is a conceſſation of many eminent Doctors, to which purpoſe *Wierus* in his *Preſtigiis demonum*, gives you their whole Genealogie at large, as alſo how they can converſe with men by articulating Voices, nay tells us not a few of their Pranks, by way of carnal copulation with both Sexes; *Cardan* comes likewiſe to matter of fact and gives an acccount of Aerial and Terreſtial Spirits, and how a Predeceſſor of his had an Aerial familiar at his devotion, that made him a Relation of their place and natures, and how they lived and died, as men do, but that they continued much longer, which was the leaſt admiration (granting the reſt to be true) becauſe the purity of their Eſſence, might well imply a duration far exceeding the lives of men; but let this paſs as the Romantick part of Spirits, and Demonology; and yet I do not ſee, how this Doctrine could have been introduced, had it not been (in a high degree) ſupported by fixtion, ſince there is ſo little teſtimony either devine, or humane, which gives us

a ſufficient demonſtration of their being; though I find it as difficult to inform my ſelf of the being of Air, of Light, of Stars, and whatſoever is of ſo refin'd and excellent a ſubſiſtence as theſe, (notwithſtanding I allow them all the Eſſentials of Bodies) as I do to ſatisfie my ſelf, what is an incorporeal ſubſtance; wherefore methinks that nicety might well be waved by them without putting ſo much abſurdity on Reaſon, and Nature, ſince it is poſſible to conceive a Body of ſo refined and excellent a being, that it may ſuit in good part with their definition of a Spirit, to which purpoſe, I remember an ingenuous expreſſion in a late Author, who affirms, that if light could be ſuppoſed inviſible, it might be called a Spirit, and yet I ſuppoſe without doubting whether Light be a Body or no.

My Reaſon doth not more ſtagger at any part of the Doctrine of Spirits, then that I am not ſo well acquainted with my own Soul (which I am taught is a Spirit) as to define what it is, nor am I able to ſilence my admiration, if that be granted, how

how an Incorporeal can Operate on a corporeal, or partake of any paſſion with it, wherefore I do not beleive I prejudice my Faith, if I allow what actuates my Body, and is call'd my Soul to be likewiſe a Body, though the moſt excellent part of my Compoſition; in like manner I do not ſee how any mans opinion deſerves the reproach of Impiety, or Atheiſme, though he denies the immortality of the Soul, from any ſpiritual præexiſtence; it could have before joyned to the Body; becauſe it is equally within the power of omnipotence, to make it eternal, whether it be ſo, (in it ſelf) or no, a Conception doubtleſs more reaſonable then the other, which implies it to be not only of a Spiritual, and different Eſſence, but capable to receive the impreſſion of paſſions, and Defects, incident to the body, to which purpoſe the Philoſophicall Poet *Lucretius* hath it thus.

Quippe

Quippe etenim mortale æterno jungere, & una
Conſentire, putare, & fungi mutua poſſe,
Deſipere eſt; Quid enim diverſius eſſe putandum eſt,
Aut magis inter ſe disjunctum diſcrepitanſq;
Quam mortala quod eſt, immortali atq; perenni
Junctum in concilio ſævas tollerare procellas.

There is no Doctrine doth ſo much unprinciple nature, (were not our Faiths fixt to beleive it) as this of the immortality of the Soul, wherefore it ought to be more ſparingly treated, ſince we cannot but obſerve our ſubſiſtencies to depend on ſuch elementary compoſitions, as we behold in Plants, and Animals, which as they exiſt from a due temperament of theſe, ſo we live and die, like them, as theſe materials periſh, and decay in us: we have excellencies above them, but ſubject to generation, and corruption, as much as they; we cannot prove

our

our immortallity by any vertues in our Nature, as being men; to conclude therefore an Eternity annexed to our Souls otherwiſe then by a particular diſpenſation from above, (as is already expreſſed,) is too like deifying our ſelves, by ſuppoſing what is of a devine Nature, to partake the diſorders & corruptions of ours, wherefore it behoves us to acquieſs on providence, for what ſhall be our future condition, as being moſt ſuitable to Reaſon, and the humility of Faith.

There was never any Religion, but in ſome kind or other, aſſerted not only the being of Spirits, but their viſible appearance unto men, (whether by ſuch Bugs to awe the Conſcience, and ſo conſequently the ſuperſtition of them, made the advantage of ſuch as firſt deſigned the ſeveral Impoſtures:) thus the antients called the Ghoſts of ſuch as were departed, *Manes*, ſometimes their *Umbræ*, as we read in *Virgil*.

Me patris Anchiſæ, quoties humenti-
(bus Umbris,
Nox operit Terras, quoties Aſtra ignea
(ſurgunt,
Admonet in ſomnis, & turbida ter-
ret imago:

But whether to be raiſed by Sorcery, or Conjuration, according to the Doctrine of the Jews and Chriſtians and moſt other perſwaſions at this day acknowledge, is hard to determine, ſince the greateſt part of the Magick of the antients, conſiſted rather in Spells or Inchantments, as is to be ſeeen in *Ovid* in the practice of *Medea*, rendred by Mr. *Sands*.

With Spells and Charms I break the
(Vipers Iaw,
Cleave ſolid Rocks, Oaks from their
(Seaſures draw,
Whole Woods remove, th' airy Moun-
(tains ſhake
Earth force to groans, and Ghoſts
(from Graves awake.

Not

Not unlike to what is affirmed of Witches amongſt us, at this day; but by what Authority they held the appearing of Ghoſts and Spirits, is not certainly to be gathered; with us they are held generally to be Souls of men departed, or elſe the Divel, or evil Angels, converting themſelves into humane ſhape, or raiſing dead Bodies of men from the Grave, and ſo walking in them: to refel either of theſe ſuppoſitions (waving the ſeveral Stories told of apparitions of this kind, and their converſe with men) it may be required how any reaſonable man can judge it poſſible, that a Spirit, *quatenus* a Spirit, can be diſcerned, ſeeing it is no ſmall contradiction to the Opticks, in imagining the Rayes of Viſion can terminate on an immaterial or incorporeal ſubſtance; A man may as well affirm a vacuity is to be diſcern'd by Viſion, or any thing which wants the nature of an Object: but I ſuppoſe the greateſt Bigots for this Doctrine, will wave this part of it, and affirm rather their taking of Bodies; but there the queſtion will lye as hard upon

upon them, by demanding how an incorporeal can actuate a corporeal ſubſtance, as is before touched, which till reſolved, there is no clearing of the doubt.

He that attributes the ſuppoſition of walking Spirits, to the *Phenomena's* incident to Dreams, or ſuch thoughts as are common enough with penſive and ſollitary perſons, ſhall find he hath good reaſon to doubt their real appearance, if he conſider how oft the imagination (eſpecially when alone) and in the dark, is repreſenting falſe Objects to the Sence, becauſe the fancy is then moſt prevalent on thoſe Sences, which want mediums to operate by themſelves; thus when the Eyes cannot Act by ſeeing, the imagination and endeavours to entertain it by Phantaſmes, inſtead of real Objects, which very often makes no leſs an impreſſion on that Sence, then if the Viſion had been perfectly true, alwayes partaking more or leſs from the temperament of the body, as is evident in all Dreams, and Deluſions of that kind; if the imagination be diſpoſed to be chearful, the *Idæas* repreſented

preſented by it ſhall partake of the ſame Alacrity, if otherwiſe full of Stupidity, Melancholy, and Horror; to which purpoſe, I remmember the Relation which *Plutarch* makes in the life of *Brutus*, who ſitting drowſie and indiſpoſed (by reaſon of weighty thoughts) in his Tent, was ſurprized, by apprehending that he ſaw the *Spectrum*, or Apparition of *Iulius Cæſar*, when it was more probable a Phantaſme produced by his imagination, which ſuggeſting to him the murder of ſo great a perſon, together with the guilt of his ingratitude (his life having been given by him at the battel of *Pharſalia*) cauſed this horrour and reluctancy in himſelf (as the learned Mr, *Hobbs* obſerves) and not the Ghoſt of *Cæſar*: the like hath been not ſeldome obſerved in ſuch as have committed hainous ffoneces and murders who have thought themſelves hanted with the dreadful Apparitions of the walking Spirits, or Ghoſts of ſuch perſons.

As men have given themſelves ſuch imaginary terrors, ſo the Night hath

been generally observed the most proper season for these impostures of the Brain, Besides as Mr. *Sands* observes in his Commentary on *Ovid*, the Antients had an opinion that Ghosts and Spirits assuming an aery, thin, and fluxative Body, by the heat of the Sun extenuated and dissipated, could not be seen by the more vigorous light of the day, whereas they received a condensation by cold, and consequently from the night, to which purpose *Anchises* in *Virgil* saith to *Æneas*.

Iamq; vale, & turquet medios nox humida cursus.

But this opinion (or rather conceit) is fitter to have place amongst vulgar Errors, then to be patronized by the Antients.

Whether that was a true Apparition of *Samuel* to *Saul* which the Scripture mentions, I will not dispute, though made no small one by devines, and perhaps but an imposture by the Witch, which meeting with an extream desire in *Saul* to have *Samuel* raised, complyed the force of his imagination accordingly to receive

ceive the Object ſhe preſented inſtead of him; but this is only fit to be offered as a doubt, rather then an interpretation of the place, becauſe the literal ſence (where there is divine Authority) ought to be allowed the beſt: for other Stories and Relations of this kind, they are only fit to fill a volume of Wonders, or as my Lord *Bacon* ſaith of Propheſies, to be the entertainment of a *Chriſtmaſs*-fire, ſince he that will give other reputation to them, then comes to the hearing, is like to beleive what he is not able to prove true.

Of Self-Intereſt.

HE that conſiders the power that Intereſt hath with men, would think that providence had little to do with their Actions, being ſo generally committed to the conduct of ſelf reſpects; but then, it muſt be acknowledged a more then ordinary effect of the all diſpoſing power, that publick Societies are ſo well cement-

ed together as they are, ſince private intereſt devides more then it unites; how few are there but will violate the ſtricteſt ties of Relation, or Freindſhip, if they check never ſo little with their intereſt, ſo that the obligations of either are ſeldome continued longer, then as they conduce to, or pay well the intereſt of ſelf-ends; Tis mankind's univerſal injuſtice, and keeps Conſcience like a Minor committed to a diſhoneſt Guardian, never to know her value or content: how ſtrangly doth almoſt every particular man play the Tirant, to ſerve his private concern, what will they not do to accompliſh it? The very Peaſant may be obſerved as Arbitrary, (ſo far as is within his power) as the moſt tirannical of Princes; the Court, City, and Country, are but ſo many ſeveral Stages, where men Act the ſame parts a different way: he that is a good Judge of Intereſt, cannot but be knowing of mankind, becauſe it ſwayes ſo much our Actions; as he that is acquainted with the byaſs of a Bowl, will beſt judge how far it will be guided by it: The

Fable

Fable of *Narciſſus* is an ingenuous deſcription of ſelf-Love, as it reſpects the external beauties of our ſelves, and doubtleſs, there are many which are of this effeminate complexion, without examining whether the internal Graces of the Soul, be any part of their admiration ; But all this is far ſhort of the concern and eſteem, we have for intereſt, though it be a paſſion leſs deſerving then the other , becauſe I may admire the Act of providence in the one, but cannot ſo well own it in the other, as being the management or rather dotage on an irregular Appetite : were there more Religions in the World, then there are, it would be impoſſible to practice one without this will worſhip ; we have ſaved Heaven a labour in obliging us to love our ſelves ; there is no reformation of manners or doctrine which hath moderated the zeal of Self-intereſt : On the contrary, I fear that men ſhift Conſcience too often, for private reſpects, putting on the old man inſtead of the new ; how many amongſt us have been better'd in their dealings for

being enrolled in the Society of Presbiterian, Independant, or other of our novel perſwaſions : I cannot but wonder how mens carriages ſhould be ſo Phanatick towards Heaven, and yet ſo Politickly ſerious in order to their own worldly Ends, which ſhews us, that Religion and Pollicy have ſhook hands too long, to be eaſily diſjoyned : I wiſh the effects of ſo great an evil, as it hath been a cauſe of our late calamity, in along, and bloody civil War, ſo it be not of a dangerous conſequence to the future.

As there can be no ſuch entireneſs, or virtue, in a government, which the ſiniſter practices of men will not deprave, ſo it hath been generally advantageous to the deſigns of Active and ſubtle Natures, to be turbulent and factious, becauſe there are few diſſentions in a Republick, or Monarchy, which are not conſiderable enough to ſerve the intereſt of ſuch that have any capacity to prejudice it ; wherefore we may frequently obſerve (without going far from home for examples) that men have

have intrigued with Factions, on purpoſe that they might be taken off by ſome conſiderable preferment, and ſo have traffick'd with the diſcontents of the State, to make their profitable returns ; We have heard of Patriots of their Country, but prove few that will not take a reaſonable compoſition for their honeſty. If men will deal thus with their Prince, their Religion, the publick, to ſerve their Siniſter deſigns , what are we then to expect of one another in our private concernments, where the incitements of Avarice, Revenge, Luxury, are ſo generally prevalent; beſides the intereſt that virtue can give, hath ſo narrow and inconſiderable an account in the world, in reſpect there are ſo few good men, or at leaſt that have capacity to ſerve it, that were it not for its own Ethical value, and the eſteem it receives from ſuch as are deſervingly accompliſhed, there were little reaſon to be virtuous or good at all.

Machavel doth lay it down for a Maxime, that it is hardly poſſible for a Prince to be a juſt or good man, and

manage well his Rule or other Transactions with so many bad, wherefore he requires that he should be so far ill himself as to be able to avert the evil of others, when design'd against him: the Case is no less applicable to private persons, who finding themselves beset with the dishonesties of the world, are too aptly inclined to Sympathize with the same evil manners of others, as judging it to be their necessary defence; Nor is it to be doubted, but very many out of this consideration, rather then a natural aversion to good, permit themselves (as the more profitable expedient) to be practically wicked; yet notwithstanding this depraved condition of humane affairs, good men are not only preserved, as they oblige the care of providence, or as there is a prudence accompanies the justice of their Actions, but as it doth not lie in the power of the bad, to be so mischevous as they would be, though within their capacity, or power to effect it to which purpose there is a notable observation of the foresaid Author in his discourses upon *Livie*, that it is equally

qually difficult to be evil or good in extreamity, of which he gives a remarkable example of a Tirant of *Bologna*, that loſt the Dominion that he had uſurped, (though by all the execrable policy imaginable) for not being able to be wicked enough : Beſides, a diſhoneſt intereſt is ſeldome managed with ſuch caution, and ſubtilty, but a reaſonable apprehenſion will make diſcovery of the end it tends too, for ſuch will be ſure to have enough of themſelves in whatſoever they propoſe or endeavour to acccompliſh : and generally the beſt caution that can be given the good, is to deal with men as if they were bad, ſince we do not prejudice the world in beleiving it to be evil, provided we manifeſt our ſelves to be good.

Of Pleaſure.

IT was a notable ſaying of *Epicurus*, that every Animal aſſoon as born doth affect and purſue Pleaſure, as its cheifeſt good, and morover, that it is for Pleaſure alone, for which we deſire all other things, but that, in conſideration meerly of it ſelf. Whether this great Phyloſopher placed too much of his *ſummum bonum* in the contentments of our Appetites, I will not diſpute though it be reaſonably to be argued, that a good part of our ſatisfactions muſt naturally be ſuch; why otherwiſe ſhould our natures permit ſuch deſires in us, or providence concur in the preſervation and exerciſe of them, we muſt have our Toyes and Paſtimes in our Childhood, and Youth, and we are hardly ever wean'd from our deſires; Youth will be fond of delights, and Age loves no leſs to be pleaſed, we arrive not generally to call our pleaſures vain, until we are by

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accident or time diſabled to purſue them longer; and doubtleſs *Solomon* himſelf (as may be gathered by his Story) was pretty well paſſ'd the delights of the World, before he pronounced his *Vanitas Vanitatum*: I have known ſome who have ſeverely rebuked the love of Pleaſures in others, that ſome time of their lives they were addicted too themſelves, when the ſcandal perhaps that ſuch ſeem to receive, may be rather their concern, that they are paſt them, or not able to enjoy them as they had done before; So that ſuch Satyriſts may have their exceptions urged againſt themſelves: the foreſaid Author defines Pleaſure to be ſo agreeable to Nature, and Reaſon, that he takes it for granted, that none ever made it a queſtion why men ſhould love it; no more, then why they deſire happineſs: If it be demanded, whether the contemplation of Pleaſures be more delightful then their actual enjoyments, it may be anſwered in the Negative, becauſe there is too ſtrict a familiarity betwixt the Soul (whatſoever is its ſubſtance) and the Body, not to be par-

partakers; Neither is it to be demonſtrated how the mind ſhould contemplate any Object of delight, did not the Tincture of the Senſes comply, or prompt its contemplation of ſuch Objects, as have been actually injoyed before, for it is not poſſible for us to have an *Idea* of any thing otherwiſe, (our Bodies and Minds being ſo fetthred together) as he that had never been riding or hunting, could not poſſibly conceive of himſelf, what either ſhould mean; though it may be ſafely affirmed, that in all our Actions, whenſoever the mind hath the greateſt ſhare of delight, the contentment muſt be more ſupream and refined; Wherefore it is not poſſible that Beaſts ſhould have the ſame ſatisfactions with men in any Act or Contentment of Nature, becauſe they want the reſult of thought as *Des Chartes* obſerves.

But theſe are ſome general notions of Pleaſure; for what concerns their particulars, or uſe, they are too many to come within the compaſs of this diſcourſe, ſince they are as various as the paſſions and affections of men, from whence

whence they receive more or leſs eſteem, and ſo likewiſe have their exceſſes and defects; as ſome will not paſs a day without thoſe recreations, and diverſions, which others think enough to receive once a Quarter: there is no certain Standard to be found of our Appetites; I have known men who have taken that pains of watching and riding, for a days hunting, that another man would ſcarce have done to have been Maſter of a Province; and it is very rarely ſeen that ſuch as effect Pleaſures, are men of buſineſs, for there is nothing more thwarts it: Sir *Philip Sydney* was obſerved to ſay that he liked Hawking next to Hunting worſt, which implyed he had little eſteem for either. There are ſome which go perhaps further, and diſlike all Sports and divertiſements, but theſe are not many, as there are few to be obſerved who have great averſions to Society, Muſick, or the like; Beſides ſuch an Auſterity, as it is a Symptome of a diſingenuous or froward diſpoſition, ſo it is deficient to Nature, which requires ſome entertainments and delights,

lights, in order to the preſervation or bettering of health, if there is a moderation in theſe accordingly: it may be a good entertainment of time and diverſion of our ſelves, to play for five ſhillings which might be an abuſe of both, if for five hundred pounds; here it may be demanded, why men ſhould be affected with ſo vain an Avarice, as exceſs of gaming tends to; I conceive there is little more to be ſaid for it, then is for the reſt of our affections and appetites: how few of theſe do we manage with due moderation, or without offence to our ſelves; we ſeldome eat or drink but more then we need, there is little to be found in us of equality; we love it neither in tempers, or condition of our lives, an evenneſs of living hath too much of confinment in it; men will rather be more or leſs, then alwayes the ſame; as we ſee in Gameſters, who have ſuch a various experience of Fortune, yet will be ever daring of her oppoſition; there is ſomething doubtleſs in hazarding our concerns, that hath a Heroick agreement with

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our natures, as ſome will rather chuſe to adventure their perſons in War, then live unconcerned by danger; neither is it poſſible that ſucceſs ſhould be more doated on then it is by men of this humour, ſo that an inconſiderable ſum which is won, pleaſes more, then a far greater, by any other means acquired; Though of all the exorbitancies of our inclinations and habits, there is none deſerves a greater reſentment then exceſs of Gaming; what can be ſuppoſed ſo ridiculous or Senceleſs, that is not to be found generally in the Society of ſuch, when their paſſions are provok'd by loſs; inſomuch that if a wiſe man be a Gamſter, 'tis odds againſt him, but that he forfeits ſome part of his prudence, as the examples are too many: Beſides it is no ſmall wonder, that men ſhould ſo far decline the bounties of providence, as to expoſe ſo much of their Eſtates to the arbitrement of Fortune; or that a vice which hath ſo little good nature in it, ſhould be ſo uſual and taking. I know no folly comparable to this of play, except that of love, when likewiſe exorbitant,

tant, but the latter is much more excuſable then the former, becauſe there is a ſtronger impulſion of nature to incline the appetite: ſhe hath raiſed us for her uſes, and therefore will expect to have a more then ordinary power over us, wherefore he that can withſtand the prevalency of this paſſion, may be the better able to give Law to all the reſt, drunkenneſs may be loathed, and Coveteouſneſs deteſted (though commonly a vice which out lives all the reſt) but we are too much the Children of nature, to decline eaſily the allurements of love, becauſe they propogate her being in us; if we have power of our ſelves, otherwiſe, peradvanture a Miſtriſs more abſolutely commands us, for whoſe enjoyment a Miſer will ſometimes make as dear a purchaſe as a Prodigal, to which purpoſe *Horace* ſaith it elegantly.

Num tu quæ tenuit dives Achemenes,
Aut pinguis Phrygiæ migdonias opes
Permutare velis crine licìæ,
Plenas aut Arabum domos,
Dum fragrantia detorquet ad oſcula
Cervicem, aut facili ſævitia negat
Quæ poſcente magis gaudeat eripi
Interdum rapere occupet.

The moſt different in manners and diſpoſition do ſympathize in this paſſion; it inclines the Cynick no leſs then the Epicure, for it is with Nature, as with Rivers, where their current is ſtrong, tis hard to keep them within bounds, we may bay her up a while, but ſhe will go near to break through at laſt.

I do not find it effectually determined by the moſt learned Phyloſophers, how the Soul, if granted to be a Spirit, ſhould receive any actual ſatisfaction or delight in the pleaſures of the Body, or how it ſhould comply with, or guide our Sences, in their performance of ſuch Acts, if the ſubſtance of it be affirmed to be in-corporeal; but this is oneof the great Miſteries of Nature, and not to be

underſtood (otherwiſe then by the doctrine of Faith) and therefore fit to be paſſed over: However we have ſufficient aſſurance, that the Soul is the moſt excellent part of our compoſition, as it actuates and ſuperintends the Body, and conſequently, that ſuch Acts as are moſt properly the Souls, as contemplation, and the like, are far Superiour to thoſe which ſerve the uſes of the Body, as Eating, Sleeping, and ſuch other ſenſual delights: from which conſideration we are obliged to prefer the pleaſures of the Mind as he that doth not deſire to have more acquaintance with his Soul then Body, is little beholding to nature for being a man, and hath leſs pleaſure in himſelf, then a Brute or Vegative, ſince they uſefully imploy the faculties incident to their being; we can never arrive at any proficiency in virtue, except it firſt exerciſe and delight our thoughts: I could wiſh we had as many publick Schools of morallity, as we have Churches; and poſſibly it might be ſome miſtake in the Charity of our Predeceſſours, not to erect the one with the other,

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if the Theory of Virtue had more encouragement we ſhould not be ſo deficient in the practick part; we ought firſt to make it our Study and buſineſs, and next the Ornament and recreation of our lives.

Of Power and Government.

THe right uſe of Power, is with Men, a ſubordinate providence, it being both the Conſervater and Producer of order, which effects humane Society, there is no title mankind hath ſo ſtrong to reaſon, as that they naturally admit Government, his Dominion over the Creatures, or any other Act of reaſon would otherwiſe, but weakly confirm his prerogative in being their Superiour, were he not their Soveraign as well in order as power: the reaſons that induced men to admit Governments, are ſo many and effectual,

as there needs no argument to confirm it ; Publick safety having introduced first Dominion and civil Society, to avoid the barbarous usurpation of the stronger over the weaker, men could not live Citizens of the world, and be free of one another; We had no Governments from Nature, till reason (natures guide) like an absolute Dictator conform'd us to Laws. What rule is the best , is least the question, since both Monarchies, Aristocracies and Democracies, have had their several Glories : if we shall perticularly examine the failings of these, there will be found discommendation enough for them all, although it be some praise to the worst, that it must needs be better then none at all ; for as Governments had their rise from the necessity of submitting to a Supream Power (as the best remedy that could be given their common distemperature,) so it is very impossible to compleat or maintain long such a perfect constitution, as shall not relapse into the Diseases of humane nature: For as the Body politick cannot have a well being without Laws and Government,

vernment, ſo it is not ſeldome ſeavouriſhly diſpoſed, even under the beſt of either, which ſhews us, that man is of all Creatures moſt unhappy, who can neither live free, or endure ſervitude: Luxury has alwayes been, and will ever be a temptation to Power, what elſe made *Rome* forfeit back again to the world, the dominion ſhe had obtained, who could not be ſo wiſe to preſerve it by that virtue, that conquered it; to which purpoſe *Titus Livius* makes this notable Panegirick of his Country, in the introduction of his Hiſtory, *Cæterum, aut me Amor ſuſcepti negotii fallit, aut nulla unquam reſpublica, nec Major, nec Sanctior, nec Bonis examplis ditior fuit, nec in quam, tam ſero avaritia, Luxuriaq; immigraverint, nec ubi tantus, ac tam diu paupertati ac parſimoniæ honos fuerit.*

Had this Hiſtorian lived ſome ages after, he muſt have admired the Cataſtrophy of his Country, in not being able to withſtand the temptations and riots of thoſe Nations it had ſubdued. There is no condition of Power, that can preſerve it ſelf, if it

be ſmall in dominion, it hardly can be defended by its own ſtrength, if great, and far extended, every Province it commands, hath a ſeveral danger: it cannot come ſo near virtue, as to have any medium of ſatisfaction or ſafety, being always like the Moon, varying betwixt the increaſe and decreaſe: it is very remarkable, that the greateſt of its reputation conſiſts more in the growth (as was obſerved of *Rome*) then in the ripeneſs and harveſt, which generally foreruns its declination, for as it goes ſometimes forward apace, it runs backward much faſter; ſo that tis eaſier to get Power, then to keep it: how truly is this verified in the Caſe of moſt Uſurpers, who notwithſtanding all their Arts of Tiranny, are more to ſeek in maintaining their Dominions, then in poſſeſſing them; nor need we go farther for examples of this kind, then our late revolutions; *Machavel* could give but two examples of flagitious Uſurpers, that died in their Beds, we are able in this age to add a third.

An unlawful rule hath every good man its Enemy; and is as unpleaſing

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to the bad, who will aſſoon reſent ill uſage, there is nothing more hard then to conſtitute a Government that ſhall oblige the affections of ſuch as are ſubject, wherefore *Machavel* adviſes his Prince, rather to depend on his being feard, then loved, (if both cannot be accompliſhed, which is ſome difficulty) becauſe men love at their own pleaſure, but may fear at his; There is no virtue can give a Dominion ſo great ſecurity, as Power, wherefore the foreſaid Author calls good Arms, the beſt eſtabliſhers of good Laws. The *Romans* who placed the greateſt virtue of their Government in their Arms, found their Laws no leſs correſpondent; and t'were a ſtrange abſurdity, if we ſhould ſuppoſe, that ſuch as know how to make War, ſhould be ignorant in the Arts of Peace, becauſe the firſt is reaſonably ſuppoſed the end of the latter.

As Power is the intereſt of States and Monarchies, ſo private perſons are no leſs ambitious in their own Sphears; there are nothing but Emulations in all capacities, ſuch as are loweſt in the world, are not without

aſpiring, and not ſeldome greater in the vulgar, becauſe they would not only be Superiour over ſuch of their degree, but ſuperintended thoſe above them; Power is the worlds general Miſtriſs but like the fate of love, conſtant to few, there is no Suparlative degree, can fit it; a good man can ſcarce rule it well, or a bad one with all his Arts preſerve it, there is nothing more coy to be humoured long, our Neighbour Kingdome of *France*, hath been both in danger of ruine, and at the greateſt heigth of that Monarchy, in leſs then 20. years. If therefore we make a ſtrict obſervation of Empires, of States, of Miniſters of Government with all their dependencies, we ſhall find, that as they are exalted by degrees of prudence and magnanimity, ſo they decline by the inconſiderate Steps of Imprudence, Sloath and Vanity.

Of Example.

A Man hath not only the Example of himſelf, but the worlds to advantage his Wiſdome and Virtue, wherefore it becomes our prudence to inſtruct our ſelves from the beſt Preſidents of life, whether paſt or preſent, and by them to provide for our future good; This *Ariſtotle* ſomwhere calls a devine providence of our Reaſons, and it is ſome wonder (if conſidered) how many more worthy Examples there have been, then there are to be found in the practice of men, as if the good only lived to themſelves, and not for the inſtruction of others; on the other ſide, as the bad are more frequent, ſo they are no leſs followed, which tells us, that the being good, is rather eſteemed a notion, then worthy of imitation: Virtue may be the ſollitary felicity of a few, but Vice wil not be ſo confined, *Nemo ſibi tantum errat, ſed*

ſed alii erroris cauſa & Author eſt : There is a falſity even in the beſt of our moralities, no perfection we can challenge, but hath a near Neighbourhood with evil, the Prodigal is miſtaken for the liberal, and the liberal for the covetous, and ſo likewiſe the reſt of our good and evil inclinations, nature is beforehand with our vices. In the Examples of our fore-Fathers, how few of our Parents, are little better then unjuſt and vitious Preſidents to their Children, under whom they are rather taught the Enormities of Life, then the Rules, or practice of virtue. The moſt famous Schools of the Phyloſophers have produced but few worthy patterns, inſomuch that it may well be demanded, why the Stoicks (above all other) ſhould be ſo rigid in their precepts of morallities and apathy of Paſſions, which is ſo far from being exemplary, that it admits no practice, as if it were poſſible to be ſick, and well together; not conſidering that our natures are too infirm to be wholly recovered by inſtructions, they may be mended, but

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not perfected by them: there is no ſubject which the learned have more miſtook, then example, inſomuch that *Seneca* never fell ſo much below the dignity of his ſence, as when he gave this great Panagyrick to the ſuicide of *Cato*, *Liquet mihi cum magno ſpectaſſe gaudio Deos, cum Vir ille acerrimus ſui Vindex, gladium ſacro pectori infigit, cum Viſcera ſpargit, & animam manu educit*, becauſe it was not impoſſible but his life might have been ſerviceable in ſome degree or other, even at that time to his Country, notwithſtanding the victories of *Cæſar*: the like may be ſaid of *Brutus*, who (beſides the Obligation he had to *Cæſar*, in having his life given him at the Feild of *Pharſalia*) might have judged it a greater meaſure of prudence and virtue to have ſpared his own life, as alſo to have deſiſted from taking Arms and engaging his Country in a bloody civil War, when the Commonwealth of *Rome* was too much altered to be reſtored, beſides which; he ought to have conſidered, that a juſt Monarchy was with leſs inconvenience to have been expected, then

then the profecution of a War, attended with ſo many miſcheifs to his Country; neither was it to be reputed ſo great a magnanimity in either of theſe *Romans* worthies, ſince the terrour of death hath in many inconſiderable and undeſerving men produced the like effects; and what is worſe, every diſcontented murtherer of himſelf, doth in ſome degree, paralel the praiſe, that can be given to this Action of *Cato's* or *Brutu's*: If the example had been given of *Attilius Regulus*, his commendation had been more excuſable, who by his deſire to the Senate gave himſelf a willing Martyr to the tyranny of the Carthaginians, becauſe he judged that the ſafety of his Country did inevitably require it, the difference being betwixt their virtues (if duly conſidered) that *Regulus* his glory was to die, when he might have lived, whereas the Suicide of *Cato* may be imputed either to his Pride, Shame, or fear of living longer.

If our conſiderations aſcend to the greateſt Thrones of Princes, we ſhall not often find their *Fames* ſo conſpicu-

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ous, as to merit the praiſe of being an example: To which purpoſe the wiſe Hiſtorian *Tacitus* doth very ſingularly mention *Nerva*, with this gracious commendation, *Divus Nerva res olim inſociabiles miſcuit, imperium & libertatem*, which is, that this Prince united the long diſcordant intereſts of Empire and liberty: What *Tacitus* could not obſerve in *Rome*, is remarkably happy in the government of *England*, which for ſome ages hath enjoyed that felicity under Monarchy, that it deſerves to be exemplarily practiſed by other Nations; the World hath been long (above all others) full of the fame of *Alexander* the Great, and *Iulius Cæſar*, the latter of whom may be juſtly allowed the nobler pattern, both of Military and Moral virtue, (beſides the advantage of his Eloquence, and having a Pen more great, then the Empire he poſſeſſed) yet even in both of theſe, there were defects, which leſned the glory of their higheſt virtues; the firſt of whom (beſides his other intemperancies) did (as it were) with his own hand blot out that magnanimity that accompanied his Renown and

and Victories, in the murther of *Caleſtines*, which ſhewed enough his inſufficiency to govern the vaſt dominion he aſpired to, and that his ſucceſs was rather to be attributed to a happy temerity in him, then a vertuous prudence: And although there is nothing ſo ignominious to be charged on the account of *Cæſar*, there is enough to render him more then ſuſpected of Vice, as in the ſtory of *Cleopatra* and others; nor did the vanity of his ambition appear in any thing more, then that he made the other his preſident, to which purpoſe, reading the deeds of *Alexander*, he ſhed tears for not having at the ſame years, performed the like actions, which did in a manner accuſe his ſubſequent ambition, as not neceſſitated but deſigned, and by his tears, he expreſſed that he was rather ſorry he had not for his inſatiable deſire of glory ſhed as much blood, as the other had done before him; in ſhort, as he commanded ſo many Armies and Countries, his ambition as powerfully ruled him, to which he was as much enſlaved as the meaneſt of his Captives. If with theſe were conſidered

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the moſt warlike Princes and Captains that have been before and after them, we may ſoon find (notwithſtanding the Trophies which Hiſtory hath raiſed to their memories) that their names have been likewiſe exalted on the deplorable ruine and deſtruction of men, how many Cities are at this day deſtroyed, and layd deſolate by the fury of ambition, and cruel thirſt of Dominion, or perhaps on a more inconſiderable quarrel: Which conſideration made *Seneca* thus bitterly inveigh againſt *Alexander* the Great, *An tu putas eum ſanum, qui a Græcia primùm cladibus in quâ eruditus eſt incipit, qui lacædemona ſervire jubet, Athenas tacere.* There are doubtleſs more laudable examples to be drawn from *Socrates*, and ſome others of the Phyloſophers, then are generally to be found in Courts or Camps, by how much it is a far nobler endeavour to compleat the virtues of morallity by living up (as much as in us lies) to Reaſon, and Nature, together with the divine conqueſt of our ſelves, in ſubduing our paſſions and irregular affections, then to rule, or vanquiſh

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Territories, which may be accomplished by the force of others, whereas in this victory, we have no other aid, but our selves against our selves, though it be most difficult and the glorious of conquests; this costs the world no Tears or ruine to lament, but rather is most deservedly its joy and truest triumph, to the effecting whereof, very many of the Earths great Potentates have been found too weak.

Another consideration there is on this subject, and it is very remarkable, which is, that notwithstanding in all conditions of men, there are to be observed so few patterns of virtue, yet even of them the very worst should generally do much better then they are, nay more, in the same capacities of life, have far exceeded the fame of the good; thus hath an ill man been held to be a good King, when a good one hath not been allowed that Repute (as our Histories note of *Edward* the Confessor, and others) who were better men then Princes;) so likewise in the infetiour conditions and relations of Commerce, Friendship, Neighberhood

bourhood, Manners, the duties of both Sexes in their conjugal reſpects, with many others; there are more practically good, then really ſo, for which we may conclude our ſelves leſs beholding to the humanity of our natures, then we are to Intereſt, Ambition, Vain-glory, and a Shame men have naturally in them, whereby they are withheld from diſcovering to the World, how evil they would be; as for theſe Reaſons men appear not actually ſo bad, as they are inclined, ſo they alſo generally expreſs themſelves much better then they are, eſpecially by their Writings; were it not for which, we had been little beholding to examples paſt, and might have wanted thoſe inſtructions that have produc'd good ones in the future; Books being the Feilds of the learned, where for their preſent and future Reputation, and Glory, they ſow their beſt ſeeds of Virtue though not alwayes growing from their Actions, which makes me leſs ad-

mire to find in *Seneca* ſuch excellent precepts, (worthier perhaps were never beſtowed on the World by the Pen of man) againſt Covetouſneſs, Ingratitude, and the like, and yet himſelf egregiouſly charged with both, the latter in the Caſe of *Agrippina* who had raiſed him to the favour of *Nero*, and the former noted, (if not reproached) by the Satyriſt Juvenal.

——*Et magnos Senecæ predivites (hortos.*

We muſt therefore judge the Actions, and Inclinations of men (like the Elements of which they are compoſed) mixt and imperfect, where they do well, we muſt imitate their doings, and where they write better, then they live, we ſhould practice their precepts; from ill men there is ſome advantage to be had, though from the good more: and as every

every particular man ought to be leſs concerned with the virtues of others, then in being good himſelf, by the ſame Reaſon, we ſhould draw the beſt out of examples, of all kinds, to perfect better in our ſelves.

Of Contentment.

KNow thy self, was anciently held the Council of an Oracle, and for the worthiness of the Apothegme deserves no less a repute: If we are well acquainted with our selves, we are not only a means of our own Contentment, but of improving a requisite, and beneficial Knowledge of the world, since every mans inclinations and affections will prompt him to judge of those which are naturally in others, nor doth it much avail a man to be wise abroad, and a Fool at home: We must well catechise our selves, before we are fit for our selves, or the School of the world, and must be our own Schollers, before we can be wise or exemplary to others: he that overcomes

comes the paſſions and diſorders of his own nature in the civil War that reaſon hath with them, gives Law to the World and himſelf together; And it is certainly the moſt glorious of victories, ſince it is impoſſible to find ſuch Enemies to our Virtues, as thoſe that War in us, there being nothing more hard then to be overcome by our ſelves; the beſt part of our Souls (our reaſons) are baffled with our ſenſualities, and paſſions, which are ſtill checking our Contentment; The World contributes leſs to each mans infelicity, then he doth himſelf: the preſent things we deſire more then is needful for us, and with concern for the paſt are more unneceſſarily diſquieted, inſomuch that we are enſlaved to our Appetites more unreaſonably then Beaſts, which are guided only by the preſent impulſions of their Natures; we are ſeldome at ſo much repoſe with our ſelves, as to be wiſe, or contended, ſo that for the moſt part we imploy our underſtand-

ings to be more miſerable, and criminal together: T'were endleſs to recount all the miſcariages, and diſturbancies of our Natures; If we obſerve well the paſſions of anger (and moſt turbulent guide of the reſt) we ſhall find that the reformation of that one perverſe affection, is a Theam large enough for our Lives, it being impoſſible to be at any quiet or contentment, where this irrational diſturber of man hath too great predominancy; and as it is the univerſal Moleſter of our Peace, ſo we ought to make our greateſt oppoſition againſt this paſſion, which raigns both in the civilized and barbarous parts of the world, being a Diſtemper more Epidemical then all others that afflict us. Our Concupiſence, though it be far more the Act of Nature (together with all the Allurements of Beauty) is very ſingular, in reſpect of this affection; *Helen* had but few admirers of all thoſe *Grecians* which beſeidged *Troy*, nor are there many to be found amongſt

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the worſt of mankind who are meanly affected with the ſordid Vice of Covetouſneſs, or a furious Envy, Ambition, and the reſt of our depravities; whilſt anger not only diſturbs our private Contentments, but in a moment doth incenſe Families, Cities, Nations, and Princes, Rebellions, Murders, with all other miſcheivous Machinations of men, which paſſion may well give the greateſt diſturbance to every mans peculiar Contentment, ſince it is a general diſquiet to the World: Mankind is much beholding to Nature, that this paſſion hath rather its fits, then a long continuance, *Actum eſſet de hominibus, ſi pertinax ira fuiſſet, adhuc cum brevi duret, quid pejus*, ſaith *Seneca*: And as we often are incenſed without cauſe, ſo we continue our anger, leaſt it ſhould appear ſo much to our diſgrace, to have begun without occaſion. There is no man is obliged to live ſo free from paſſion, as not to reſent an injury or evil, and it were rather Stoical Stupidity, then

virtue, to do otherwiſe; but as we can not live alwayes in a calm, conſidering the ſtorms which are raiſed againſt us by our paſſions, ſo we ſhould endeavour (like an expert Pilot) to be more cautious in theſe tempeſts which threatens the ſafety of our reaſon: And it is ſtrange to obſerve the divers effects that paſſion produceth, it revealeth the ſecret intentions of the mind, not only in a weak man, (who as *Soloman* ſaith hath his Heart in his Mouth) but aſſoon makes diſcoveries in the beſt, and quickeſt capacities, ſuch being ſooner inflamed who comprehend moſt, by reaſon that their Spirits are more ſubtle and peircing, and conſequently more apt for the Fire of paſſion: which effects though not ſo common, are likewiſe obſervable in the moſt reſerved and cloſeſt Natures, inſomuch that *Tiberius Ceſar*, (that great Maſter of diſſimulation,) could not conceal his paſſion and truth together, as is judiciouſly obſerved by *Tacitus*, in the caſe of *Agrippina*.

Hoc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere, correptamq; græco versu admonuit, ideo lædi, quia non regnaret.

The Academicks reckoned but four Passions, Fear, Desire, Joy, and Greif, according to that of *Virgil*, *Hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentq; dolentq;* but I should rather reduce them all under that one of desire, on which doubtless, the rest either directly, or indirectly depend, since whatewe enjoy with content, is as much our desire, as whatsoever we are desirous to have, Nature hath cut off the Cost and Luxurious Impertinencies of our affections, in Food, Rayment, and the like, in being contented that her necessities should be cheaply, supplied, nor is that value (if consider'd) to be given to humane things, that a man would be a suppliant from them to the greatest Monarch; there are few men so miserable, that may not find satisfaction in themselves and their condition

dition of Life, because it is in every mans power to terminate his desires; to which purpose it was devinely said by *Seneca*, *Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Iove de felicitate contendit*: Were not our contentments less beholding to reason, then our desires, this might easily be accomplished, whilst by their disorders we are induced to value more a future trouble, or evil, then a present repose, or good, according to that of *Iuvenal*.

——Quid tam dextro pede concipis, (ut te,
Conatus non poeniteat, votique peracti.

The things we most desire, have their disatisfactions that come and go with them, whilst in their pursuit, we do but round a Circle to be giddy at last; If we have not what we would, tis but (at worst)

worſt) being contented with what we have; a ſure means of diſcharging that anxiety of mind, in reſpect of our condition, or other mens; If I poſſeſs not ſo great an Eſtate as many do, there are ſome of them perhaps (notwithſtanding their abundance) injoy leſs then I, aſwel as there are more who have not ſo much as either; we could willingly change Fortune, and Riches with many, but there are few, who would perhaps (if they might) be any one of thoſe men, on any account; In like manner, we judge of our own diſcontentments but know not how far they are exceeded in the ſame kind in others: It was the ſence of a great Phyloſopher, that if every mans troubles and afflictions were publickly known, there would be found few who would not aſſoon bear the burthen of their own, as thoſe of another mans; As our preſent Contentment is in the power of our Reſolutions, So we have as much

much command of the future; and it is but ſuppoſing the worſt that we apprehend, or can happen to us already come to paſs; he that thus prepares himſelf, needs not fear his tranquility of mind, ſince he reſolves to give it himſelf.

FINIS.

ERRATA:

PAge 2. line 21. for *turned* read *tearmed*, p. 50. l. 16. r. *ſeek*, p. 60. l. 29. r. *hath*, p. 64. l. 27. r. *another*, p. 65. l. 8. r. *irritate*, p. 92. l. 5. r. *in the truth*, p. 103. l. 7. r. *endowment*, p. 110. l. 14. for *abſolet* r. *obſolete*, p. 144. l. 19. for *loves* r. *loafes*, p. 159. l. 23. r. *offences*.